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TIDAL TITLE AND THE BOUNDARIES OF THE 
BAY: THE CASE OF THE SUBMERGED "HIGH 
WATER" MARK 
John A. Humbach* and Jane A. Gale** 
The unique character and special public importance of lands bor- 
dering the sea have been recognized since ancient times.' In the 
nature of things, shore lands, together with the waters which cover 
them (permanently or periodically),. have a number of valuable uses 
not shared generally with inland territories. Navigati~n,~ pa~sage ,~  
f i~hery ,~  and bathing5 are among the particular uses of the shore or 
adjacent sea for which the public has traditionally received greater 
or lesser legal protection. However, this list is neither exclusive6 nor 
closed. For example, the recent avalanche of accretions to our stock 
of ecological knowledge has heightened (if not created) a general 
awareness of the economic importance of tidal areas as a source of 
ocean nutrients and as a sink for ocean  pollutant^.^ 
'Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. B.A., Miami University 
(Ohio); J.D. summa cum lnude, The Ohio State University College of Law. 
**Student, Fordham University School of Law. B.A., Fordham University. At the time of 
preparation of the briefs in the Appellate Division in the case of Dolphin Lane Associates, 
Ltd. v. Town of Southampton, discussed a t  length infra, Ms. Gale was a para-legal in the 
litigation department a t  the firm of Mudge, Rose, Guthrie & Alexander, counsel for the Town 
of Southampton and the Trustees of the Freeholders and Commonalty of the Town of Sou- 
thampton. 
1. Comment, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometime Submerged Traditional 
Doctrine, 79 YALE L.J. 762, 763-64 (1970). The author noted that, according to Justinian's 
INSTITUTES, the sea and shore were "common to all" and that no one therefore was forbidden 
access to the shore. Id., citing JUSTINIAN, INSTITUTES 2.1.1-.6. See also F. Maloney & R. 
Ausness, The Use and Legal Significance of the Mean High Water Line in Coastal Boundary 
Mapping, 53 N.C. L. REV. 185, 198-99 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Maloney & Ausness]. 
2. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Shultz, 116 N.Y. 382, 387, 22 N.E. 564, 565 (1889); People v. 
Vanderbilt, 26 N.Y. 287 (1863). 
3. Barnes v. Midland R.R. Terminal Co., 193 N.Y. 378, 85 N.E. 1093 (1903). 
4. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Schultz, 116 N.Y. 382, 22 N.E. 564 (1889); see Martin v. 
Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 412 (1842), quoting LORD HALE, DE JURIS MARIS. 
5. Tucci v. Salzhauer, 40 App. Div. 2d 712, 336 N.Y.S.2d 721 (2d Dep't 1972), aff'd, 33 
N.Y .2d 854, 307 N.E.2d 256, 352 N.Y .S.2d 198 (1973). 
6. It  is suggested that there are nine separate uses of or interests in the shore: navigation; 
ports; passage; commerce; fishery; sand, gravel, shellfish, and seaweed; bathing (recreation); 
conservation and aesthetics; and the "public interest." Comment, supra note 1, a t  781-87. 
7. See Comment, Can New York's Tidal Wetlands Be Saved? A Constitutional and Com- 
mon Law Solution, 39 ALBANY L. REV. 451, 545-56 (1975). The New York State Legislature 
has found that wetlands "constitute one of the most vital and productive areas of our natural 
Heinonline - -  4 Fordham Urb. L.J. 9 1  1 9 7 5 - 1 9 7 6  
92 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. IV 
The allocation of the use of inland territories via the market 
mechanism, oiz, by private purchases and sales of various private 
rights to use and/or possess, produces a fairly rational and efficient 
pattern of land use for such terri torie~.~ However, it is the character- 
istic of shore lands that many of their unique uses may be taken 
advantage of efficiently only if such uses are enjoyed by large num- 
bers of  person^.^ For example, the rights to use shorelands for fishing 
or bathing do not require exclusivity to be enjoyed, and the enforce- 
ment of exclusivity would result in drastic under-utilization of the 
shore's capacity to sustain these uses. Of course, the allocation of 
the shore for these purposes could still be attempted through private 
purchases and sales of private rights of use, since a right to use may 
be "private" without necessarily being "exclusive."1o Nonetheless, 
inefficiency is bound to result if private purchases and sales are 
relied upon to allocate all potential uses of shore lands. The market 
mechanism is simply inadequate to effectuate an efficient allocation 
of such uses because the "transaction costs" would be too high." 
To take an extreme case, if the right to navigate the tidal waters 
depended upon negotiation with every owner of the subjacent soil, 
navigation (or a t  least lawful navigation) would be in such areas 
impossible. This would be true even if the price exacted by the 
subjacent owners were nominal. Transaction costs would form a 
world . . . ."Tidal Wetlands Act g1, N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 790 (McKinney 1973). The Atlantic 
commercial fishing industry is dependent on the tidal salt marshes virtually for its existence. 
Hitchcock, Can We Save Our Salt Marshes? 141 National Geographic 729 (1972). More than 
75 species of fish, including commercially important species, spend some part of their lives 
in the marshes and as  much as 95 percent of the catch may be nurtured by the marshes. Id. 
See also United States v. Baker, 2 Envir. Rptr. Cas. 1849, 1850-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). 
8. Even for inland territories, the pattern of use produced by the market mechanism is 
by no means perfect, as  testified to by the need for zoning laws, environmental regulations, 
eminent domain proceedings, and other "collective" solutions to resource use and allocation 
problems. 
9. See generally Comment, supra note 1. 
10. For example, the right of an apartment tenant to use common halls and stairways may 
be a "private" right, but it is not an "exclusive" one. 
11. Transaction costs would include not only the costs (expense and trouble) of finding 
the appropriate seller and, for the seller, of having someone available to receive a prospective 
buyer; also involved would be the costs of negotiating the transaction of purchase and sale 
in which the desired rights to use are acquired and of policing out those who do not pay. Thus, 
transaction costs would be borne initially by both buyer and seller. However, such costs may 
be partially or wholly shifted from one to the other, depending upon the relative elasticities 
of demand and supply for the right to use in question. 
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barrier to the acquisition of rights of use,I2 and this transaction-cost 
barrier would be all out of proportion to the barrier created by 
possible costs inherent in the resource utilization itself. The result 
would be under-utilization of the shore resource in question.I3 
The navigation case, though extreme, is not atypical for shore 
front uses. With most if not all of the peculiar shore uses, (e.g., 
bathing, fishing), the use-associated costsi4 are typically close to nil, 
whereas the transaction costs are s u b ~ t a n t i a l . ~ ~  Hence, the almost 
inevitable result of removing shore resources from the public do- 
main is to insure under-utilization of the shore. 
Where the magnitude and deterrent effect of transaction costs is 
greatly disproportionate to the use-associated costs, and the latter 
are insubstantial, a cogent argument may be made, in the name of 
efficiency and overall welfare, for setting a user-fee of zero-thereby 
obviating all transaction costs (though leaving use-associated costs 
where they fall). That is to say, an argument exists in such cases, 
12. The barrier may be total, as would likely be the case with navigation rights, or it  may 
be partial, as for example where fishing or bathing rights are involved. In the cases of bathing 
and fishing, the appropriate seller of such right (oiz. the possessor of the subjacent soil) can 
fairly readily establish a collection point and policing mechanism to assure that only those 
who pay his price can avail themselves of the rights (or licenses) to use which he may 
dispense. If demand is sufficient (in the relevant price range), he may cover his transaction 
costs, and the costs associated with use per se, and he may likely achieve a profit (or economic 
"rent") besides. 
The barrier created by a price which is based on transaction costs, use-associated costs and 
economic "rent" will not be a total barrier if there are some potential users willing to pay 
such a price. However, if there are potential users willing to pay a price equal to use- 
associated costs, but who are not willing to pay additional amounts, then the inclusion of 
transaction costs (and economic "rent") in the price will result in at  least a partial deterrent 
to potential users. 
13. Even ignoring the possibility of an economic "rent," the collection of a user-fee which 
includes transaction costs will assure (absent infinite inelasticity of demand) that the shore 
will be under-utilized compared with the utilization that would occur if use-associated costa 
were the only deterrent to use. That is, if the costs of collections and policing are borne out 
of user-fees, the amount of such fees will need to be correspondingly higher than would be 
fees that reflected use-associated costs alone; thus, charging the higher fees will have the 
effect of deterring more potential users than would be deterred if the fee reflected only use- 
associated costs. 
14. I .e . ,  costs incurred because of the use per se, ignoring the opportunity cost of foregone 
economic "rent." 
15. Realistically, one must also take account of the fact that, if user-fees are charged and 
transaction costs are thereby recovered, the temptation will exist (if demand makes it  feasi- 
ble) to tack on a further amount as a profit or economic "rent." This of course would exacer- 
bate the under-utilization effect of the transaction cost barrier and further justify the position 
that the price of use should be zero. 
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for conferring a right to use upon the public generally. 
By conferring such a public right of use, recognition would be 
accorded to pressures to use which, though very real, cannot be 
satisfied by the market even though the prices which potential users 
are willing to pay may equal or exceed the use-associated costs 
involved in such satisfaction.l6 The overpowering effect of dispropor- 
tionate transaction costs prevents satisfaction of any part of this 
demand except for those potential users who are willing to pay a 
huge surcharge over use-associated costs in order to obtain the use. 
Only with a societal (i.e., legal) decision to set the price of use a t  
zero will there be anything like close alignment between the use 
demanded (at a price equal to use-associated costs) and the rights 
to use which are in fact supplied. 
The law has long recognized, though generally implicitly, that the 
allocation of shore land uses cannot as a practical matter follow the 
private-purchase-and-sale model employed for inland territories; 
i. e., that public rights to use must be recognized in order to avoid 
the public inconveniences which are the concomitant of under- 
utilization. The Romans' answer was to regard the sea and the fore- 
shores as res communes: all could use but none could privately 
own." After the fall of Rome, when law in general and property law 
in particular pragmatically took on something of "might makes 
right" aspect, the power of adjacent possession was far more impor- 
tant in the allocation of shore land uses than were notions of com- 
monality of interest.I8 
In England, which achieved a semblance of central control some- 
what earlier than the rest of Europe, it was apparently the King who 
held the might; under the so-called "prima facie rule," given the 
judicial imprimatur in 1633,19 the King was held to have absolute 
fee title to tide waters and tide-flowed lands with an unqualified 
right to make such conveyances as he saw fit.20 This largesse exer- 
16. These prices and costs are at the margin. See generally Economics and Public Policy 
in Water Resource Development (S. Smith & E. Castle ed. 1964). 
17. Maloney & Ausness, supra note 1, at 198. 
18. For the history and its philosophical impacts on modern thinking, see Comment, 
supra note 1, at 763-74. It has been observed that the period of non-recognition of public rights 
in the shore more or less coincided with a general loss in interest in commerce or other 
activities which would have made such rights necessary to public convenience. Id. at 772-74. 
19. Attorney-General v.  Philpott, (1633) described in Attorney-General v.  Chamberlaine, 
70 Eng. Rep. 122, 123 (V. Ch. 1858). 
20. See Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 198 N.Y. 287,291,91 N.E. 846, 
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cised by the King on behalf of himself apparently was an important 
factor in the Grand Remonstrance and uprisings which, in 1649, 
brought the Stuart Dynasty (temporarily) and Charles I (perma- 
nently) to an end.21 But even before, based upon some not-too- 
compelling language of the Magna Charta,22 time had been eroding 
the absoluteness of the King's claim. Apparently among the earliest 
public rights to achieve recognition were those of navigation and 
fishery.23 And the right to navigate may have never been eclip~ed.~'  
The growth of commerce and other pressures to reopen shore uses 
to the public had their evident influence upon judicial thinking, and 
the trend of the law was to expand the public's right of use. As this 
trend became clear, a theory was developed to take account of such 
public rights of use. Known as the "public trust" doctrine, the 
theory essentially was that the King, as owner of the soil beneath 
the sea and its arms, held i t  subject to a trust for the protection of 
the public and the public's acknowledged rights of use.25 Moreover, 
although conveyances of the King's ownership interest in underwa- 
ter lands remained possible,26 the transferees would take subject to 
the public trust.27 
These ideas amounted to a bifurcation of the "absolute" title 
which the sovereign held in shore lands subjected to the trust. On 
one hand, there was the jus privatum, or private right, which a 
person (sovereign, quasi-sovereign or private) could have with re- 
spect to the soil itself, i.e., a fee title.28 On the other hand, there was 
847 (1910); Maloney & Ausness, supra note 1, a t  198-202. 
21. See Town of Smithtown v. Poveromo, 71 Misc. 2d 524, 336 N.Y.S.2d 764 (Dist. Ct. 
1972), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., People v. Poveromo, 79 Misc. 2d 42, 359 N.Y.S.2d 
848 (2d Dep't 1973); Parsons, Public and Riva te  Rights in the Foreshore, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 
706, 708 (1922) [hereinafter cited as Parsons]. 
22. One commentator has traced the manner in which obviously teleological judicial 
reasoning "expanded the Magna Charta almost unrecognizably over the years." Comment, 
supra note 1, a t  765-68. 
23. Parsons, supra note 21, a t  708; see Blundell v. Catterall, 106 Eng. Rep. 1190 (K.B. 
1821). 
24. Comment, supra note 1, a t  781-82. 
25. Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 198 N.Y. 287, 91 N.E. 846 (1910); 
Teclaff, The Coastal Zone-Control Over Encroachments into the Tidewaters, 1 J .  MARITIME 
L. & COMMERCE 241, 263 (1970). 
26. See Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 424-27 (1842); People ex rel. Howell v. 
Jessup, 160 N.Y. 249, 54 N.E. 682 (1899); People v. Vanderbilt, 26 N.Y. 287 (1863). 
27. Blundell v. Catterall, 106 Eng. Rep. 1190 (K.B. 1821). 
28. Id. 
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the jus publicum, or public rights of use, which could be enjoyed by 
persons a t  large despite the fact that the jus privatum may have 
rested in other hands.29 The jus publicum (as a public right of use 
held in trust by the sovereign or its appropriate assignees)30 was a 
kind of easement or incorporeal interest which could exist simulta- 
neously with, and be a burden upon, the private fee title Gus 
privatum) held by a n ~ t h e r . ~ '  
As has been previously stated, the King's jus privatum or fee title 
could be32 and often was conveyed. Conveyances of the jus 
publicum, however, were apparently severely circ~rnscribed,~~ with 
public bodies or representatives probably being the only eligible 
takers." The reason for the distinction is obvious: whereas the jus 
29. People v. New York & S.I. Ferry Co., 68 N.Y. 71, 76 (1877); People v. Vanderbilt, 26 
N.Y. 287, 292-93 (1863). 
30. E.g. ,  municipal corporations. Apparently, the King always had the power to delegate 
his governmental powers to local governing bodies. See Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 
367 (1842);' In re Mayor of N.Y., 182 N.Y. 361, 75 N.E. 156 (1905); People ex rel. Howell v. 
Jessup, 160 N.Y. 249, 54 N.E. 682 (1899). A similar power is of course recognized (within 
Constitutional limits) for the states as successors to the King's sovereignity. Illinois Central 
R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453-54 (1892); People ex rel. Howell v. Jessup, supra. 
31. Although the burden of the jus publicum was made paramount to the residual fee 
ownership rights of the private owner ( i .e . ,  the jus priuatum) the absoluteness of the burden 
as an interference with the fee owner's rights of private use was perhaps always less than the 
burden of, say, an ordinary easement of way. In any event, the New York Court of Appeals 
developed a sort of "reasonable user" test to permit the public's right of use to  be to some 
extent balanced against the private upland owner's interest in making meaningful use of his 
own rights. Barnes v. Midland R.R. Terminal Co., 193 N.Y. 378,85 N.E. 1093 (1908); Town 
of Brookhaven v. Smith, 188 N.Y. 74,80 N.E. 665 (1907). In those cases, it was held that  the 
littoral (i.e., seaside) owner's right of access to the sea could be facilitated by permanent 
structures extending over the tidelands despite the fact that such structures would inevitably 
result in some impairment (albeit insubstantial) of passage by the public along the shore. 
But the littoral owner was permitted to interfere with public passage "just so far as it was a 
necessary consequence of the reasonable exercise" of the rights necessary to reasonable use 
of the upland. Barnes v. Midland R.R. Terminal Co., supra a t  386, 85 N.E. a t  1096. See also 
Tiffany v. Town of Oyster Bay, 234 N.Y. 15, 136 N.E. 224 (1922). 
32. See Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 424-27 (1842); People ex rel. Howell v. 
Jessup, 160 N.Y. 249, 54 N.E. 682 (1899); People v. Vanderbilt, 26 N.Y. 287 (1863). 
33. The question is complicated by the issue of whether parliamentary approval (or in the 
new world, legislative approval) was necessary or even effective to validate particular grants. 
See Comment, supra note 7, a t  478-82; cf. Marba Sea Bay Corp. v. Clinton St. Realty Corp., 
272 N.Y. 292, 296-97, 5 N.E.2d 824, 825-26 (1936); Brookhaven v. Strong, 60 N.Y. 56 (1875). 
34. Delegations to a municipality of the sovereign's power and property were (and are) to 
be held by the recipient municipality in trust for the people, Tiffany v. Town of Oyster Bay, 
234 N.Y. 15, 21, 136 N.E. 224, 225-26 (1922); People ex rel. Palmer v. Travis, 223 N.Y. 150, 
119 N.E. 437 (1918); Town of Brookhaven v. Smith, 188 N.Y. 74,78,80 N.E. 665,666 (1907); 
In re Mayor of N.Y., 182 N.Y. 361, 365-68, 75 N.E. 156, 158 (1905); DeLancey v. Piepgras, 
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privatum belonged to the King in a more or less private proprietary 
capacity-as much as any other property owner holds title to his 
lands, the jus publicum was held as sovereign, on behalf of the 
people generally, and thus should not be extinguishable by mere 
unilateral act of the trustee.35 As an American court has said: "The 
State can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the 
whole people are interested . . . than it can abdicate its police 
powers . . . . "36 
These rights, powers and limitations of the English sovereign over 
the shore lands were generally taken over in New York following the 
Rev~ lu t ion .~~  The state became the successor to the King's interest 
in crown lands,38 and the jus privatum in previously conveyed par- 
c e l ~ ~ ~  and the jus publicum in the shore generally were preserved.40 
138 N.Y. 26, 33 N.E. 822 (1893), and municipal powers over waters were always subject to  
the sovereign power of the state, Knapp v. Fasbender, 1 N.Y.2d 212, 230-33, 134 N.E.2d 482, 
491-93, 151 N.Y.S.2d 668, 681-85 (1956); People ex rel. Palmer v. Travis, supra; People v. 
Vanderbilt, 26 N.Y. 287 (1863), and not being contracts within the impairment of obligations 
of contracts clause, such municipal powers are revocable a t  the pleasure of the state, Hunter 
v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178-79 (1907); Demarest v. Mayor, 74 N.Y. 161, 167 (1878); cf. 
In  re Long Sault Dev. Co., 212 N.Y. 1, 10, 105 N.E. 849, 852 (1914). 
Apparently, a municipality's property rights in water-lands, being held governmentally 
"for public purposes . . . to be administered for the public good," are similarly subject to 
legislative modification and perhaps even extinction. People ex rel. Palmer v. Travis, supra 
a t  164-67, 119 N.E. a t  442-43. This may be true despite the fact that other municipal lands, 
if held in a proprietary capacity, may require compensation for taking. Id. Contra, Darlington 
v. City of N.Y., 31 N.Y. 164 (1865). 
35. See Parsons, supra note 21, a t  715. 
36. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892). 
37. People v. Steeplechase Park Co., 218 N.Y. 459, 473, 113 N.E. 521, 525 (1916); People 
ex rel. Howell v. Jessup, 160 N.Y. 249, 257, 54 N.E. 682, 684 (1899); People v. New York & 
S.I. Ferry Co., 68 N.Y. 71, 78 (1877); Lansing v. Smith, 4 Wend. 9 (1829); accord, Martin v. 
Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842). 
38. Roberts v. Baumgarten, 110 N.Y. 380, 383, 18 N.E. 96, 97 (1888); accord, Shively v. 
Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1894). The "prima facie rule" that  the King, and the state.as his 
successor, holds title prima facie to those sea and shore areas not previously granted to others 
was initially recognized in People v. Vanderbilt, 26 N.Y. 287 (1863), but it was not without 
hesitation, Barnes v. Midland R.R. Terminal Co., 193 N.Y. 378, 85 N.E. 1093 (1908); Town 
of Brookhaven v. Smith, 188 N.Y. 74, 80 N.E. 665 (1907); Parsons, supra note 21, that  the 
notion finally received a firm foothold in New York, People v. Steeplechase Park Co., 218 
N.Y. 459, 113 N.E. 521 (1916). 
39. Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 198 N.Y. 287, 291, 91 N.E.,846, 
847 (1910); Barnes v. Midland R.R. Terminal Co., 193 N.Y. 378, 384, 85 N.E. 1093, 1096 
(1908); People ex rel. Howell v. Jessup, 160 N.Y. 249, 257, 54 N.E. 682, 684 (1899); Sage v. 
Mayor of N.Y., 154 N.Y. 61, 82-83, 47 N.E. 1096, 1102-03 (1897). 
40. People v. Steeplechase Park Co., 218 N.Y. 459, 479, 113 N.E. 521, 526 (1916); Lewis 
Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 198 N.Y. 287, 291,91 N.E. 846,847 (1910); Sage 
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Like the King, the state acquired the power to convey its right in 
shore lands to private takers4' and to transfer the jus publicurn to 
appropriate public bodies,42 but it could not, in general, divest itself 
of the jus publicurn in favor of private persons.43 In fact, as inter- 
v. Mayor of N.Y., 154 N.Y. 61, 82-83, 47 N.E. 1096, 1103 (1897); Trustees of Brookhaven v. 
Strong, 60 N.Y. 56 (1875). Because of the federal government's power to regulate commerce 
and navigation, U.S. CONST. art. I, 8 8 the jus publicum was itself divided, the federal 
government having paramount control within its sphere of constitutional jurisdiction, e.g. for 
navigation. Greenleaf Lumber Co. v. Garrison, 237 U.S. 251 (1915); People v. Hudson River 
Connecting R.R., 228 N.Y. 203, 219, 126 N.E. 801, 806 (1920); Lewis Blue Point Oyster 
Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, supra. 
41. People v. Steeplechase Park Co., 218 N.Y. 459, 473, 113 N.E. 521, 524 (1916); People 
v. New York & S.I. Ferry Co., 68 N.Y. 71, 78 (1877); Wetmore v. Brooklyn Gas Light Co., 42 
N.Y. 384 (1870). 
42. In re Mayor of N.Y., 182 N.Y. 361,365, 75 N.E. 156, 157 (1905); People ex. rel. Howell 
v. Jessup, 160 N.Y. 249, 257, 54 N.E. 682, 684 (1899); see Coxe v. State, 144 N.Y. 396, 407, 
39 N.E. 400, 402 (1895). 
43. This is not to  say that the jus publicum may not, in certain instances, be cut down or 
extinguished by grants of the jus prioatum. See, e.g., People v. Steeplechase Park Co., 218 
N.Y. 459, 113 N.E. 521 (1916); Barnes v. Midland R.R. Terminal Co., 193 N.Y. 378, 85 N.E. 
1093 (1908); People v. New York & S.I. Ferry Co., 68 N.Y. 71 (1877). And the state (or 
municipal owners) may authorize the erection of private structures (e.g., a bridge) which 
interfere to some degree with the public's right of use. People ex. rel. Howell v. Jessup, 160 
N.Y. 249, 54 N.E. 682 (1899). Indeed, the court of appeals has gone so far as  to say that: 
The right [of the state] to grant the navigable waters is as absolute and uncontrollable 
. . . as  its right to grant the dry land which it owns. I t  holds all the public domain as  
absolute owner, and is in no sense a trustee thereof, except as i t  is organized and 
possesses all its property, functions and powers for the benefit of the people. 
Langdon v. Mayor of N.Y., 93 N.Y. 129, 156 (1883). 
However, holdings in later cases, recognizing the public purpose of the state's title as a 
limitation on its power to convey, indicate that  the statement just quoted cannot in its 
extremity be taken as the law of New York. See, e.g., Marba Sea Bay Corp. v. Clinton St. 
Realty Corp., 272 N.Y. 292, 5 N.E.2d 824 (1936); In re Long Sault Dev. Co., 212 N.Y. 1, 105 
N.E. 849 (1914); Coxe v. State, 144 N.Y. 396, 39 N.E. 400 (1895). Although the court of 
appeals' decisions from the Revolution forward seem impossible to fully reconcile on this 
point, a probably truer statement of the law is that, when the state grants underwater lands 
to private persons, "the contemplated use . . . must be reasonable and one which can fairly 
be said to be for the public benefit or not injurious to the public." In re Long Sault Dev. Co., 
supra a t  8, 105 N.E. a t  852 (emphasis added). 
Apparently, this power of the state to extinguish or cut down the jus publicum in favor of 
private persons is a departure from the common law as  i t  developed in England where, a t  
least as understood here, even the King and Parliament together were not competent to effect 
such a result. Coxe v. State, supra a t  406,39 N.E. a t  402, citing Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 
(16 Pet.) 367 (1842). On the other hand, the states' expanded power of disposition to private 
persons, permitting extinction of the jus publicum, suggests the appropriateness of new 
limitations of a different sort-either on the types of eligible grantees or on the uses for which 
the grants may be made. Thus, grants for uses in furtherance of commerce are permissible, 
e.g., Saunders v. New York Cent. & H.R.R.R., 144 N.Y. 75, 38 N.E. 992 (1894) (railroad 
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preted in New York4%nd elsewhere45 in this country, the interest in 
preserving the public's rights was so strong that limitations were 
imposed on transfers of the jus priuatum which were perhaps wholly 
unjustifiable in light of the King's extensive power to convey. Al- 
though grants of private ownership of the jus priuatum (no matter 
to whom, how extensive, or for what purposes) should theoretically 
have no effect on the always paramount public rights of use,46 such 
conveyances-especially if of large tracts4' of underwater 
lands-have been held invalid by the courts where no public pur- 
pose could be shown.48 And even with attempted conveyances of 
smaller parcels of jus priuatum, the courts have rather jealously 
guarded the public interest. Although the "beneficial enjoyment" of 
the fee may be granted in the case of such smaller conveyances, even 
without a showing of public purpose, and even to the detriment of 
the public's rights to use,49 it has been held that "the validity of the 
conveyance turns on the degree to which the public interest will be 
impaired . . . ."50 Moreover, in construing grants allegedly convey- 
ing jus priuatum, courts have employed a rule of strict construction, 
holding that no interest in trust lands passes unless specific lan- 
purposes), as  are grants to  the upland owner for beneficial enjoyment (i.e., almost unqualified 
private use), e.g., People v. Steeplechase Park Co., supra, but grants to persons other than 
upland ownen for purely private purposes have been struck down, Marba Sea Bay Corp. v. 
Clinton St .  Realty Co., supra; Coxe v. State, supra; accord, Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 
U.S. 387 (1892). And all such grants are probably subject to the limitation that  the public 
interest not be impaired as a result. Roe v. Strong, 107 N.Y. 350,358, 14 N.E. 294,296 (1887); 
Riviera Ass'n v. North Hempstead, 52 Misc.2d 575, 276 N.Y.S.2d 249 (Sup. Ct. 1967), opinion 
adopted, Mannor Marine Realty Corp. v. Wachtler, 22 N.Y.2d 825, 239 N.E.2d 657, 292 
N.Y.S.2d 918 (1968); see Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, supra a t  452; In re Long Sault Dev. 
Co., supra. 
44. See note 43 supra. 
45. E.g., Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892). 
46. Tiffany v. Town of Oyster Bay, 234 N.Y. 15, 20-21, 136 N.E. 224, 225 (1922); Lewis 
Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 198 N.Y. 278,91 N.E. 846 (1910); People v. New 
York & S.I. Ferry Co., 68 N.Y. 71, 78 (1877). 
47. For the effect of the size of the granted parcel as  a factor limiting the state's power to 
convey, see Teclaff, supra note 25, a t  265-68. See also Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 
387 (1892). 
48. Marba Sea Bay Corp. v. Clinton St. Realty Corp., 272 N.Y. 292, 5 N.E.2d 824 (1936); 
Coxe v. State, 144 N.Y. 396, 39 N.E. 400 (1895). 
49. E.g., People v. Steeplechase Park Co., 218 N.Y. 459, 113 N.E. 521 (1916); Wetmore 
v. Brooklyn Gas Light Co., 42 N.Y. 384 (1870). 
50. Riviera Ass'n v. North Hempstead, 52 Misc. 2d 575,582, 276 N.Y.S.2d 249, 257 (Sup. 
Ct. 19671, opinion adopted, Mannor Marine Realty Corp. v. Wachtler, 22 N.Y.2d 825, 239 
N.E.2d 657, 292 N.Y.S.2d 918 (1968). 
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guage of the conveyance shows the intention to convey them.51 
The reasons for imposing such restrictions on conveyances of jus 
privatum are not entirely clear, although the failure of the courts 
to carefully distinguish the private right from the public's rights 
may be suggested as one e x p l a n a t i ~ n . ~ ~  Another explanation is that 
the courts, contemplating the huge and unique shore land resources 
still owned in fee by the public, came to regard even the fee 
title-the jus privatum-as somewhat "affected by the public 
interest." As such, the courts simply balked a t  the thought of whole- 
sale divestiture of this public domain by a possible improvident 
generatiod3 which would thereby bind (in more ways than one) all 
future generations. Furthermore, there is the fact that private own- 
ers of the jus privatum can, by their use, effectively cut down or 
even extinguish the jus publi~urn.~4 In short, transfers of the jus 
privatum and jus publicum were not carefully distinguished be- 
cause they are not really entirely distinguishable. 
In any event, we have reached the point today where the jus 
publicum is not generally c~nveyab le ,~~  but the jus privatum is con- 
veyable subject to fairly stern limitations, both on the character and 
the form of the conveyances. 
Most of the judicial decisions to date in New York have concerned 
themselves with the questions of which attempted state convey- 
ances are permissible and with the rights which may be enjoyed 
under the jus privatum and jus publicum respecti~ely.~~ Curiously, 
comparatively little attention has been paid to the question of defin- 
ing the upland limit of the shore lands subject to the public rights, 
51. The existence of the trust for the public, and public inconvenience that  can readily 
result from conveyances of trust lands, see note 43 supra, are reasons for employing this rule 
of strict construction against the grantee. Sage v. Mayor, 154 N.Y. 61, 79-81, 47 N.E. 1096, 
1101-02 (1897). "In patents from sovereign to  subject the rule of construction which controls 
. . . is reversed and the terms are taken most strongly against the grantee, because the public 
interest is involved." Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 198 N.Y. 287, 292, 
91 N.E. 846, 847 (1910); accord, Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 10, 13 (1893). This rule of 
construction applies to grants by municipalities as well. In re Mayor of N.Y., 182 N.Y. 361, 
75 N.E. 156 (1905). 
52. See Comment, supra note 7, a t  478. 
53. A measure of earlier improvidence is the name of the statute: "An Act for the Speedy 
Sale of the Confiscated and Forfeited Estates within This State . . . ." ch. 64, [1777-871 
N.Y. Laws 127 (1784). 
54. See note 43 supra. 
55. But see note 43 supra. 
56. See text accompanying notes 44-55 supra. 
Heinonline - -  4 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1 0 0  1 9 7 5 - 1 9 7 6  
19751 "HIGH WATER" MARK 101 
i.e., how to determine the boundary between those lands which are 
subject to the jus publicum and those which are not. Yet, because 
of the entirely different methods of use allocation applicable in the 
case of shore lands (as compared with inland territ~ries),~' this ques- 
tion would seem, in many cases, to be at  least as crucial as the ones 
which have so many times engaged the courts. 
Actually, the problem of locating the boundary between shore and 
upland has significance for a t  least two purposes. One, as just men- 
tioned, is to determine the upland limit of the shore lands which are 
subject to the public's right of use; i. e., defining the "servient tene- 
ment" of the jus publicum. The other purpose is to locate the sea- 
ward boundary of the parcels which, in instruments of conveyance, 
are described as extending "to the sea" or by a like boundary desig- 
nation. 
There is no particular policy reason why the same line should be 
used for both the upland boundary of the jus publicum and the 
seaward boundary of parcels bounded "by the sea." In interpreting 
the language used in grants of private interests, the ostensible object 
of the inquiry is to ascertain the parties' (particularly the grantor's) 
intent.5s Subject only to limitations on the grantor's estate or power 
to convey, it is that intention which controls the extent of his trans- 
fer. On the other hand, in setting the upland boundaries of lands 
subject to the jus publicum, the courts are essentially making a 
policy determination, i. e., which lands are subject to what mode of 
use-al l~cat ion,~~ a question of law in which private intentions play 
no role. Nonetheless, for reasons which seem largely historical, the 
rule of construction for grants extending "to the sea" has been held 
to result in the same boundary line as the line which, by law, defines 
the upland limits of the jus p u b l i c ~ m . ~ ~  In the case of both, the line 
57. That  is, the use of inland territories is allocated by private purchases and sales of 
rights to use andlor to possess, whereas use of shore lands is allocated, to a substantial degree, 
by recognition of rights to use as  belonging to the public generally. See text accompanying 
notes 8-17 supra. 
58. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 240(3) (McKinney 1968). 15 N.Y. JUR. Deeds 8 13 (rev. 1972). 
59. I.e., use-allocation by purchases and sales of private rights of use versus use-allocation 
(to a substantial degree) by recognizing rights to use as  belonging to the public generally. See 
text accompanying notes 8-17 supra. 
60. The rule of construction for grants extending "to the sea" seems to have resulted from 
a failure to  distinguish the King's title by jus privaturn from his title by jus publicurn. Thus, 
in the construction of royal grants of sea-side lands, the assumption was made that the King 
did not intend to part with tidal lands held as  sovereign. The confusion of jus publicum and 
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is the "high water" line.61 
As a rule of construction, and as a rule of law delineating the limit 
of the public's right of use, the "high water" line rule is not without 
;us privatum was understandable in earlier times, prior to the recognition of public trust 
notion of ;us publicum, inasmuch as the King's claim to tidal lands was apparently a claim 
to a private personal right. See Comment, supra note 1, a t  764-5,768-9. When the public trust 
ofjus publicum was later seen as qualifying this private right of the King (somewhere between 
the Magna Charta and the 17th century), the tendency to confuse the private right of the 
King (and his grantees of shore lands) with the sovereign title held for the public (ius 
publicum) apparently persisted, and this confusion continued to cloud such issues as 
whether, for example, particular grants required parliamentary ratification to be valid. Id. 
See also Town of Brookhaven v. Strong, 60 N.Y. 56 (1875); Comment, supra note 7, a t  478- 
82. American cases often continued this tradition, muddying the distinction between trans- 
fers of the private right and of the ;us publicum, e.g., Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 
387 (1892); Martin v. Waddel, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842); Coxe v. State, 144 N.Y. 396, 39 
N.E. 400 (1895), so that even after i t  became accepted that the ;us privatum was transferable 
(subject to the ;us publicum), the holding and transfer of the ;us privatum was still hobbled 
by ideas of "public good" wholly unrelated to the private interest involved. See, e.g., Tiffany .'' 
v. Town of Oyster Bay, 234 N.Y. 15, 21, 136 N.E. 224, 225 (1922); In re Long Sault Dev. Co., 
212 N.Y. 1, 105 N.E. 849 (1914). Consequently, even though in theory the separate recognition 
of the ;us publicum interest should have "liberated" the jus privatum for the freest possible 
transfer and enjoyment (subject only to the jus publicum itself), it has not had that effect. 
See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1894). The presumption that,  absent clear intent, 
grants extending "to the sea" stop a t  the mean high water line, see note 51 supra and note 
61 infra, and the limitations imposed on, for example, massive transfers of the ;us privatum 
in shore lands, see, e.g., Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, supra; Marba Sea Bay Corp. v. Clinton 
St .  Realty Corp., 272 N.Y. 292, 5 N.E.2d 824 (1936); Coxe v. State, supra, are manifestations 
of this historical confusion. Perhaps courts have refused to distinguish the private right from 
the public rights because even the private right is sufficiently affected with a public interest 
to justify limiting its free alienation. Because transferees of the private right can, by their 
use, cut down or extinguish the jus publicum, the limitations on free alienation would seem 
to be in any event an appropriate policy compromise. See note 43 supra and accompanying 
text. 
61. Examples of cases holding that the shore subject to the ;us publicum extends to the 
"high water" or "mean high water" line are Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Schultz, 116 N.Y. 382, 
388, 22 N.E. 564, 565 (1889); Tucci v. Salzhauer, 40 App. Div. 2d 712, 336 N.Y.S.2d 721 (2d 
Dep't 1972), aff'd, 33 N.Y.2d 854, 307 N.E.2d 256, 352 N.Y.S.2d 198 (1973); accord, Shively 
v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 12 (1894). 
Examples of cases holding that grants extending "to the sea" or similarly described pre- 
sumptively go only to  the "high water" or "mean high water" line are Marba Sea Bay Corp. 
v. Clinton St. Realty Corp., 272 N.Y. 292, 5 N.E.2d 824 (1936); Tiffany v. Town of Oyster 
Bay, 209 N.Y. 1 ,9 ,  102 N.E. 585, 587 (1913); In  re Mayor of N.Y., 182 N.Y. 361,75 N.E. 156 
(1905); Sage v. Mayor, 154 N.Y. 61, 69, 47 N.E. 1096, 1097 (1897); Delancy v. Piepgras, 138 
N.Y. 26, 36, 33 N.E. 822, 824 (1893). 
In the interest of simplicity and in accordance with the object of this Article only New York 
cases or cases consistent with the New York view have been cited above. A minority of states 
have not followed the English common law (and New York) rule of setting the shore boundary 
a t  high water. See Maloney & Ausness, supra note 1, .at 200-02. 
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its drawbacks. The sea is simply not compliant enough to cast its 
waters, even its high tidal waters, to any definite line. Even ignoring 
the action of the waves, which create a line that moves from instant 
to instant, the tides themselves exhibit a lack of consistency, with 
variations from tide to tide, season to season and year to year.@ As 
a natural monument for land description purposes, the sea hardly 
offers the certainty of results provided by, say, an ancient oak. And 
this is not to mention the sea-edge variations that occur due to the 
effects of erosion and accretion on the profile of the shore.03 In sum, 
62. The formulation of a serviceable definition in light of this tidal variation was the 
subject of an extended discussion by the Supreme Court in Borax Consol., Ltd. v. Los 
Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 21-27 (1935). The Court observed that in England a considerable 
measure of indefiniteness had been removed from the "high water line" formulation by 
confining the reference to "the flux and reflux of the sea a t  ordinary tides." Id. a t  22, quoting 
Blundell v. Catterall, 106 Eng. Rep. 1190, 1199 (1821). Thus, for purposes of fixing bounda- 
ries, the so-called "springW tides (unusually high tides which happen twice a month) and 
"high spring tides" (which happen a t  the equinoxials) are not controlling, nor are the so- 
called "neap" tides (unusually low tides) taken as a reference. Instead, the Supreme Court 
accepted a "mean high water line" standard and the definition of the United States Coast 
and Geodetic Survey (now called the National Ocean Survey) that "mean high water a t  any 
place is the average height of all the high waters a t  that place over a considerable period of 
time." 296 U.S. a t  26-27. Theoretically, based on the movements and relative positions of the 
sun, moon, and earth, the tidal variations repeat themselves in cycles of approximately 18.6 
years; therefore, to fix the mean high water line as'accurately as possible, "an average of 18.6 
years should be determined . . . ." Id. a t  27. For a complete discussion of tidal variations 
and their legd consequences see Maloney & Ausness, supra note 1. 
Although in most New York decisions the courts have seemed content to refer simply to 
the "high water line" as the determinant without further specification, prior to Dolphin Lane 
Associates, Ltd. v. Town of Southampton, 37 N.Y.2d 292, 333 N.E.2d 358, 372 N.Y.S.2d 52 
(1975), the standard appeared to  be the "mean" or "ordinary" high water line in this state 
as  well. See Dunham v. Townshend, 118 N.Y. 281, 287, 23 N.E. 367, 368 (1890) ("The 
important question was . . . where ordinary high water mark was . . . ."); Gucker v. Town 
of Huntington, 254 App. Div. 10, 12-13, 3 N.Y.S.2d 788, 790-91 (2d Dep't 1938) (mean high 
water mark); Rockaway Park Imp. Co., Ltd. v. City of New York, 140 App. Div. 160, 124 
N.Y.S. 1096 (2d Dep't 1910); 33 N.Y. STATE DEP'T REP. 415, 421 (1925) (mean high water 
mark). See also State v. Bishop, 46 App. Div. 2d 654,359 N.Y.S.2d 817 (2d Dep't 1974); Town 
of Smithtown v. Poveromo, 71 Misc. 2d 524, 336 N.Y.S.2d 764 (Dist Ct. 1972), reu'd on other 
grounds sub nom., People v. Poveromo, 79 Misc. 2d 42, 359 N.Y.S.2d 848 (2d Dep't 1973). 
References herein to "high water" or "high water line" are meant to refer to ordinary or 
mean high water. I t  is to be observed, however, that no matter what meaning may be attrib- 
uted to the words "high water line" as used by New York courts in the past, there is no 
indication that the reference was to vegetation lines or any other physical existence other than 
the intersections of the shores by the tidal planes. 
63. In general, where upland area is lost due to erosion of the shore, title to the area eroded 
away is likewise lost to the neighboring (seaward) owner. Correspondingly, additions to the 
upland by accretion accrue to  the upland owner to the detriment of the seaward estate. Both 
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the "high water" line, as a real estate boundary, is not a line a t  all 
but merely a linguistic formulation. And as such, it is scarcely more 
definite than the concept, "the edge of the sea," which i t  is supposed 
to define. About the only contributiofi that the "high water line" 
formulation makes to our understanding of the boundary location 
is to tell us that the division between upland and sea lies toward the 
landward, not the seaward, of the area of tidal wash. Since defining 
the sea-boundary in terms of a water-line does not get the line- 
drawers very far, it was inevitable that someone some day would ask 
the courts: "Where is the high water line?" Apparently the first 
definitive judicial resolution on this point in New York is the court 
of appeals' decision in Dolphin Lane Associates, L td .  v. Town of  
S o u t h a r n p t ~ n , ~ ~  decided in mid-1975. 
In Dolphin Lane the issue was the boundary between private 
uplands and the non-privately owned landsa5 under Shinnecock 
Bay, a tidal body of water.66 According to the court of appeals, no 
one "seriously disputed" that the high-water line was the bound- 
a r ~ . ~ '  What was disputed was the "method or proof by which the 
high-water mark shall be precisely located on the land."a8 The court 
rejected reliance on hydrographic data69 propounded as a scientific 
method for establishing the actual "high-water" line. Instead it 
decided that the high-water mark should be located on the ground 
of these general rules must be qualified by doctrines such as avulsion and reliction and by 
the principle that shore profile changes which are artificially made or induced do not affect 
the location of boundaries. See Maloney & Ausness, supra note 1, a t  224-27. 
64. 37 N.Y.2d 292, 333 N.E.2d 358, 372 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1975). 
65. Title to the lands under the body of water in question, Shinnecock Bay, was held for 
the Town of Southampton by the Trustees of the Freeholders and the Commonalty of the 
Town of Southampton. For the origin of the titles a t  issue, see note 76 infm. 
66. One of the contested issues in the case was whether Shinnecock Bay was in fact tidal 
throughout the relevant history or only since 1938, when a powerful hurricane carved the 
Shinnecock Inlet from the sea-an inlet which has been preserved in the interim by artificial 
means. Brief for Appellant a t  24-38, Dolphin Lane Associates, Ltd. v. Town of Southampton, 
37 N.Y.2d 292, 333 N.E.2d 358, 372 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1975). Also questioned was whether the 
artificial maintenance of the inlet channel, and hence of tidal variations, could have an effect 
on titles and boundaries originating in non-tidal times. Id.; Brief for New York State Land 
Title Association as Amicus Curiae a t  26-31. However, in light of its decision, the court of 
appeals did not reach these issues, and the result in this case as it may have been affected 
by these contentions is not here under discussion. 
67. 37N.Y.Pdat295,333N.E.Pdat359,372N.Y.S.2dat53.  
68. Id. 
69. I.e.,  data as to the actual level of the tides over a period of time. 
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"by reference to the line of ~ege ta t ion . "~~  The court of appeals de- 
scribed its method for fixing the high-water line as "the application 
of the traditional and customary method by which that verbal for- 
mulation [high water line] has been put in practice in the past to 
locate the boundary line along the shore."71 Thus, the court pur- 
ported to protect "the expectations of the parties" and to avoid 
introducing into the law of conveyancing an "element of uncertainty 
and unpredictability" that resort to science, as a dynamic body of 
understanding, would possibly bring.72 
The amount of certainty and predictability that the court's deci- 
sion adds to the law of conveyancing is problematical, considering 
the unpredictable nature of the line in question in the first place. 
What is more certain, however, is that by its decision the court of 
appeals has established a line of "high water" which one must go 
wading to see. 
The action in Dolphin Lane was originally brought by the upland 
waterfront owner to have certain zoning ordinances of the Town of 
Southampton declared uncon~titutional.~~ The town74 responded to 
this attack on its ordinances with a counterclaim in which it as- 
serted a superior title to parts of the lands affected by the zoning.75 
The lands claimed by the town were essentially those between the 
usually dry upland and the open water. It was this controversy as 
to title that was before the court of appeals. 
The title dispute came down to a dispute over the location of the 
boundary line between the town's lands (mostly underwater) and 
the private plaintiffs lands (upland extending to the water). At the 
trial level, the court concluded tha t  the original governmental 
conveyances under which plaintiff claimed76 extended only to the 
70. 37 N.Y.2d a t  298, 333 N.E.2d a t  360, 372 N.Y.S.2d a t  55. 
71. Id. a t  296, 333 N.E.2d a t  359, 372 N.Y.S.2d a t  54. 
72. Id. 
73. 72 Misc. 2d 868, 869, 339 N.Y.S.2d 966, 968 (Sup. Ct. 1971), aff 'd ,  43 App. Div. 2d 
727, 351 N.Y.S.2d 364 (2d Dep't. 1973), modified, 37 N.Y.2d 292, 333 N.E.2d 358, 372 
N.Y.S.2d 52 (1975). 
74. The Trustees of the Freeholders and Commonalty of Southampton intervened and , 
joined in the counterclaim. Id. For convenience, except where the distinction between the two 
is pertinent, the trustees and the town will be hereinafter referred to  as  the Town. 
75. Id. a t  869-70, 339 N.Y.S.2d a t  968-69. 
76. According to Town of Southampton v. Mecox Bay Oyster Co., 116 N.Y. 1,8,  22 N.E. 
387, 389 (1889) titles in the Town of Southampton are derived from the grant by the King to 
the Duke of York and the royal charters issued under his government. In 1676 Governor 
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Andross gave a charter to the inhabitants of what is now the town, granting to them, within 
the bounds of the town, "[a]ll of the afore mentioned Tract of Land . . . Together with all 
Rivers, Lakes, waters Quarrys Wood land Plaines Meadows, pastures, Marshes. ffishing 
Hawking Hunting and ffowling." Gov. Andross' Patent of South Hampton (1676) reprinted 
in 2 TOWN TRUSTEES RECORDS OF THE TOWN OF SOUTHAMPTON 379, 380 [hereinafter cited as 
TOWN RECORDS]. 
Ten years later, in 1686, Governor Dongan gave a second charter, the so-called "Dongan 
patent," which recited Andross' charter, and which granted, ratified, and confirmed to the 
"ffreeholders & Inhabitants of Southampton heerin after erected and made one body Corpo- 
rate and Politique and willed and determined to be called by the name of the trustees of the 
ffreeholders and commonalty of the Towne of southampton and their Successors all the afore 
recited tracts & necks of land . . . marshes swamps plaines Rivers Rivolets waters lakes 
ponds Brooks streames beaches . . . harbours . . . fishing hawking hunting fowling . . . ." 
Gov. Dongan Patent of Southampton (1686), reprinted in TOWN RECORDS 385, 388. 
The Dongan patent stipulated that "appropriated" (i.e. occupied) lands were transferred 
"to the . . . use" of the respective occupants and their heirs. TOWN RECORDS 389. This use 
was apparently executed by the Statute of Uses. Unappropriated lands were transferred "to 
the use . . . of such as have been purchasers thereof. . . made as  tenants in Common . . . ." 
Id. This use was not executed (presumably because it was an "active" use) and the legal title 
to the unappropriated lands was accordingly held by the town (with power of sale) for the 
benefit of the persons who had acquired the same by earlier conveyance, seemingly the 
Andross patent. These purchasers who thus acquired an equitable interest in the unappro- 
priated lands became known as the "proprietors" and apparently were the successors of the 
original settlers. See 72 Misc. 2d a t  873, 339 N.Y.S.2d a t  972. 
Although the Dongan patent itself was quite indistinct on the point, the court of appeals 
has since held that the proprietors' equitable interest existed only with respect to the (unap- 
propriated) uplands, and the proprietors had no interest in the lands under the water. Town 
of Southampton v. Mecox Bay Oyster Co., supra. With respect to the lands under water, the 
town acquired title in its governmental capacity with the full authority to do whatever would 
inure to the benefit of the inhabitants. See People ex rel. Howell v. Jessup, 160 N.Y. 249, 
262, 54 N.E. 682, 686 (1899). 
In 1818, in accordance with a compromise worked out between the town and the proprie- 
tors, the state legislature enacted a statute which transferred management of the remaining 
unallocated lands to trustees of the proprietors. Act of April 15, 1818, ch. 155, [I8181 N.Y. 
Laws 140. This divested the town of legal title to such lands and substituted a private trust 
arrangement for the trusteeship which had been theretofore held by the town. However, 
management of the waters was reserved to the town under the 1818 enactment, and this "sole 
control" was reconfirmed in a subsequent enactment. Act of April 25, 1831, ch. 283, [I8311 
N.Y. Laws 352. 
From the foregoing it may be observed that all private titles in Southampton are traceable 
to grants either: (1) from freeholders who held appropriated lands a t  the time of the Dongan 
patent; (2) from the town acting as trustee for the proprietors; (3) from the trustees of the 
proprietors, who succeeded the town as trustees under the law of 1818. The plaintiff in 
Dolphin Lane traced its title to the trustees of the proprietors. 
The original governmental conveyances would have been the Dongan patent and (though 
not a conveyance in the strict sense) the law of 1818, conveying legal title first to the town 
(as trustee) and then to the trustees of the proprietors. I t  was these conveyances (or, more 
precisely, the former as confirmed by the latter) that created the boundary; by creating an 
equitable interest in the upland that did not apply to the water lands, these conveyances 
effected a severance of the two. See note 88 infra. 
For additional discussion of the title history, including a description of events in the pre- 
Andross patent period, see 72 Misc. 2d a t  870-81, 339 N.Y.S.2d a t  969-75. 
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high water line.77 The trial court then proceeded to describe a practi- 
cal method for locating this line. 
Essentially, the trial court observed that natural growths of two 
types of marsh grasses predominated in the area in question. One 
type, Spartina alternifiora (cordgrass), thrives naturally only if in- 
undated twice daily by the tides. The other type of grass, Spartina 
patens (salt hay), thrives only in areas beyond the reach of the 
twice-daily tidal  inundation^.^^ In the intermediate strip between 
the "colonies" of these two types of grasses, both are found growing, 
but neither grows vigorously. The natural characteristics and 
growth patterns of these two grass types were accepted by the trial 
court as evidence of the-location of the water line.'g The court did 
not hold that these plants fixed the boundary as a matter of law but 
only that their growth was "indicative of the tidal flow for all the 
months of the year, over the course of several year~."~O Accordingly, 
the line was to be in the intermediate strip between the primary 
growth areas of the two types of grass. 
The court of appeals rejected the type-of-grass "test"81 and, as 
previously stated, held that the high water line should be located 
by reference to the line of vegetation. Although it described the trial 
court's methodology as "independent," ."novel," and "intellectually 
fascinating," the court argued that the result below would have 
significantly changed the on-the-site line and thus "do violence to 
the expectations of the parties and introduce factors never reasona- 
bly within their conternplat i~n."~~ 
Certainly the court of appeals' objective to avoid these horribles 
is commendable even if in the process a swipe must be taken a t  
groping science which, in a most untrustworthy fashion, "may one 
day [replace] . . . [the type of grass test] by an even more sophis- 
77. 72 Misc. 2d a t  882, 339 N.Y.S.2d a t  981, citing Tiffany v. Town of Oyster Bay, 209 
N.Y. 1, 102 N.E. 585 (1922). 
78. However, the areas in which Spartina patens grows may be subject to flooding by so- 
called "spring" tides which occur twice each month. See note 62 supra. 
79. See 72 Misc. 2d a t  885-86, 339 N.Y.S.2d a t  984-85. 
80. Id. The appellate division affirmed without opinion. 43 App. Div. 2d 727, 351 
N.Y.S.2d 364 (2d Dep't 1973). 
81. Although referred to as a "type-of-grass test" by the court of appeals, the method of 
the trial did not involve the use of a "test" a t  all; the trial court simply recognized the 
relevance of growth patterns as evidence. 72 Misc. 2d a t  885-86, 339 N.Y.S.2d a t  984-85. 
82. 37 N.Y. 2d a t  296, 333 N.E.2d a t  359, 372 N.Y.S.2d a t  54. 
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ticated and refined test . . . ."83 Nonetheless, it is difficult to see 
how anyone's "expectations" can be disappointed if the term "high 
water line" is deemed to mean a line which represents, according 
to the best available information, the upper (average) reach of the 
high water. It seems, in any case, to do more violence to expecta- 
tions-speaking strictly as laymen in hydrography-to place the 
"high water line" so far out in the bay that, even a t  mid to low tide, 
a person would have to wear galoshes in order to walk to the line in 
comfort. Yet, this is precisely what the court of appeals has done. 
By locating the line a t  the seaward edge of the Spartina alterniflora, 
a plant which needs tidal inundation twice-daily, the court of ap- 
peals has set the high water line on the bottom of the bay.84 
How could the court of appeals reach such a result? 
Fundamentally, the task of the court in Dolphin Lane was to 
adjudicate the boundary line between two adjacent landowners-a 
question of essentially a factual nature rather than one of law.85 In 
principle, boundaries are established either by intention or conduct. 
Usually, it  is intention which controls, meaning the intention of the 
grantor who originally created the boundary by severing a larger 
parcel into the smaller parcels which the boundary separates. Nor- 
mally, the inquiry into the grantor's intention is limited to an inter- 
pretation of the expression thereof in the instrument of conveyance. 
However, the interpretation of instruments of conveyance, espe- 
cially if ambiguous, may be assisted by reference to extrinsic 
facts-the conduct of the parties (or perhaps also their successors 
in interest) being an important source of such interpretative assis- 
83. Id. (emphasis added). For the contrary view, that resort to science presumptively 
fosters certainty and not unpredictability, see Korn, Law, Fact, and Science in the Courts, 
66 COLUM. L. REV. 1080, 1096 (1966). 
84. Slightly less hyperbolically, the court of appeals has probably in effect fixed the "high 
water line" a t  the low water line, since Spartina alterniflora is apparently not a water plant 
living in areas continuously under water. I t  would be totally baffling to set any sort of water 
line by reference to a line of vegetation if the plants in question could grow throughout the 
shallows of the bay. 
85. See text accompanying notes 58-59 supra. It may not have been a question of fact in 
the sense that its resolution should be left to the jury, of course. Compare People v. Hillman, 
246 N.Y. 467, 159 N.E. 400 (1927) with Town of North Hempstead v. Oelsner, 148 App. Div. 
779, 133 N.Y.S. 319 (2d Dep't 1912). However, even though the interpretation of instruments 
is generally left to the court, the basic issue-as to the parties' intentions-is essentially a 
factual one. By way of contrast, establishing a principle for fixing the limits of lands subject 
to the jus publicurn would be purely a question of law. 
Heinonline - -  4 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1 0 8  1 9 7 5 - 1 9 7 6  
19751 "HIGH WATER" MARK 109 
t a n ~ e . ~ ~  In addition, the location of boundaries may be affected by 
conduct when, for example, a landowner acquires an adjacent por- 
tion of his neighbor's lands by adverse posses~ion.~~ Thus, although 
the location of boundaries is normally determined according to the 
original grantor's manifested intention, conduct amounting to ad- 
verse possession or showing a more definite intention can influence 
the determination. 
In Dolphin Lane, the disputed boundary had to be located by 
interpreting the original instruments severing the upland territory 
from the lands under water,ss subject to the possibility that the 
boundary as originally established may have been relocated by ad- 
verse possession or an analogous theory. 
The history of titles in the Town of Southampton is long and 
relatively complex;89 however, for present purposes it is sufficient to 
note that, under the relevant grants, the lands under waterB0 belong 
to the town whereas the uplands were granted either to the town (as 
to unallocated lands)91 or to their respective occupants (of already 
appropriated tracts).g2 The uplands involved in Dolphin Lane ap- 
86. White v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 254 N.Y. 152, 172 N.E. 452 (1930). See also Hill v. 
Priestly, 52 N.Y. 635 (1873); French v. Carhart, 1 N.Y. 96 (1847); cf. Town of Southampton 
v. Mecox Bay Oyster Co., 116 N.Y. 1, 22 N.E. 387 (1889); Brookhaven v. Strong, 60 N.Y. 56 
(1875); Pettit v. Shepard, 32 N.Y. 97 (1865); 15 N.Y. JuR., Deeds 5 73 (rev. 1972). 
87. If a boundary is agreed between parties and improvements are made in reliance 
thereon, another basis for recognizing the shifted boundary, estoppel in pais, may exist. See 
Baldwin v. Brown, 16 N.Y. 359, 364 (1857); Bell v. Hayes, 60 App. Div. 382, 385, 69 N.Y.S. 
898, 900 (2d Dep't 1901). 
88. In this case, the line was created when the Dongan patent was delivered since it is 
under that patent that the town claims its title to the waterlands and the private owners, as 
successors to the "proprietors," claim title to the uplands. Even though, with respect to these 
particular uplands, the Dongan patent effected no severance of legal title (since the town 
received both the waterlands, legally and beneficially, and the uplands, subject to the equita- 
ble interest of the proprietors), that  patent nonetheless effected a severance as to the 
equitable title. See note 76 supra. I t  has already been held that the proprietors and their 
trustees received no interest in or power to convey the waterlands either under the patent or 
under the subsequent confirmatory legislation. Town of Southampton v. Mecox Bay Oyster 
Co., 116 N.Y. 1, 22 N.E. 387 (1889). Therefore, it is the boundary line created by the Dongan 
patent delivered in 1686 that  is controlling unless subsequent conduct or events have moved 
the line. 
89. See note 76 supra. 
90. Under the apparently dispositive grant, the ~ o n g a n  patent of 1686, the town (through 
its trustees) received the "Rivers Rivolets waters, ponds Brooks streames, beaches . . . har- 
bours . . . ." TOWN RECORDS 388. See notes 76, 88 supra. 
91. These were subject to certain equitable rights of the so-called "proprietors" who were, 
it appears, successors of the original settlers. See note 76 supra. 
92. The court in Town of Southampton v. Mecox Bay Oyster Co., 116 N.Y. 1, 15,22 N.E. 
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parently remained unallocated until 1861,93 so it was not until then 
that the boundary between these uplands and the town lands under 
water became important. By a deed delivered in 1861, the Dolphin 
Lane plaintiffs predecessor in interest received a parcel of unallo- 
cated upland described as "bounded . . . on the north by Shinne- 
cock Bay."g4 The division between waterlands of the bay and up- 
lands now became relevant and, as previously notedg5 the court of 
appeals in Dolphin Lane accepted the traditional rule of construc- 
tion in New York that. the dividing line is the line of high water. 
In giving more specific definitional content to the term "high 
water line" the court of appeals had several choices. It could adhere 
to a literal definition, requiring recourse to hydrographic data, over 
a period of time, showing the action of the tides.gfi If recourse to 
hydrographic data were deemed too cumbersome, it could use a 
"burden-of-proof' methodology: any relevant evidence tending to 
show the line would be considered, and the proponent of a particular 
on-the-site line would have responsibility for supplying sufficient 
proof.g7 Or the court could establish a "test" whereby some fact 
more susceptible to convenient proof (e.g., the line of vegetation) is 
"deemed" to be the line of high water. The last-named approach, 
that of establishing a "test," is the approach selected by the Court. 
In evaluating the appropriateness of a judicial "test," the perti- 
nent inquiries would seem to be (i) the convenience of the test, and 
(ii) the validity of the test. That is, when the courts decide cases 
on the basis of proofs other than of the fundamentally operative 
387, 391 (1889) denied that the private "proprietors" had any power to make grants with 
respect to lands under the waters. 
93. Actually, this deed was not delivered by the town but by the trustees of the proprietors 
who had succeeded, under legislative enactment, to the management of the unallocated 
lands. Act of April 15, 1818, ch. 155, [I8181 N.Y. Laws 140. This management continued to 
be for the benefit of those who had equitable rights therein. See note 76, 88 supra. 
94. 72 Misc. 2d a t  873, 339 N.Y.S.2d a t  973. This portion of the grant was confirmed by 
quitclaim deed by the town in 1899. Id. a t  874, 333 N.Y.S.2d a t  973. 
95. See text accompanying notes 65-72 supra. 
96. See note 62 supra. This was the approach taken by the Supreme Court in Borax 
Consol., Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10 (1935). The Borax case involved the extent of lands 
held under a federal grant, and accordingly, the question was decided as a matter of federal 
law. However, where no federal grants or interests are involved (as would be generally the 
case along the eastern seaboard, less so in the west), federal law defining the high water line 
is not binding on the states. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1893). But see notes 160, 178 infra. 
97. This was apparently the approach of the trial court in Dolphin Lane. See text ac- 
companying notes 78-80 supra. 
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facts, the substituted proofs should not only be easier than proof of 
the fundamental facts, they should also tend to show the existence 
(or not) of the real operative facts with a fairly high degree of relia- 
bility. Thus, to be an appropriate test, the "line of vegetation" test 
adopted by the court of appeals should not only be easier to prove 
than the actual high water line (which it is);gs it should also gener- 
ally correspond with that line. The lack of correspondency between 
the two lines under circumstances of Dolphin Lane raises a serious 
question as to the appropriateness of the test.98 
Even if a judicial test does fall short of satisfying the criterion of 
validity or reliability, it still might be appropriate to apply the test, 
subject to rebuttal, if using the test greatly simplifies matters of 
proof compared with the proof of the "real" operative fact at  issue. 
And, of course, proving the line of vegetation is much simpler than 
proof, by resort to hydrographic data over a long period, of the 
actual high water line.lo0 However, in the case of such less-than- 
reliable tests, it should a t  least be open to the litigants to show, by 
reference to more reliable data, that the true state of facts is other 
than what the "test" would indicate. That is, unless the test in 
question is very reliable indeed, it should at most operate as a re- 
buttable presumption, yielding to reality in cases where the pre- 
sumption proves to be erroneous. But the court of appeals appears 
to have established its line of vegetation test not as a rule of con- 
struction, not as a rebuttable presumption of intent; the court made 
its test a rule of property,lol which can stand stubbornly against all 
98. Using hydrographic data to  fix the actual high line, as the Supreme Court approved 
in Borax Consol.? Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10 (1935), would require observations over a 
period of 18.6 years in order to be precise. See note 62 supra. 
99. In the area in question, one of the important vegetation types was Spartina alterni- 
flora, a species requiring twice-daily tidal inundation to thrive. That  being the case, i t  is 
hard to see how the seaward line of this vegetation could possibly correspond to  the high 
water line. It is even hard to see how evidence of the seaward line of this growth could be 
relevant evidence of the high water line. On the other hand, the landward limit of this type 
of vegetation would seem to be very probative of the location of the actual high water line. I t  
was evidence of this landward limit which was accepted as evidence by the trial court and 
rejected by the court of appeals. 
100. See note 98 supra. 
101. The court stated: 
The controlling principle here is that which we wrote in Heyert v. Orange and Rock- 
land Utilities (17 N.Y.2d 352, 363): "Whatever the rule might be if this were a case of 
first impression, i t  is certain that thousands of deeds. . . have been made on this rule 
. . . . It has ripened into a rule of property . . . . ,, 
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the truth and reality which the processes of proof can pose against 
it.'02 
In fact, the court adopted the line of vegetation test as a rule 
fixing the "high water line" entirely without reference to its reliabil- 
ity as an indicator of the real high water line-the ostensible histori- 
cal boundary. At the same time, the court pointed to the "import- 
ance of stability and predictability in matters involving title"Io3 as 
the reason for its holding. If there is an apparent conflict between 
what the court did and its reason for doing it, the conflict may be 
resolved, a t  least for the specific factual context of Dolphin Lane, 
by reference to the specific background of that case. 
I t  appears that for many years i t  had been the normal practice of 
local surveyors to locate the high water line by reference to the line 
of vegetation.Io4 Furthermore, title insurers claimed to have been 
insuring titles to shore areas on the basis of these s u r ~ e y s ~ ~ h n d  a 
succession of purchasers may have taken titles based thereon. Thus, 
it was to protect the expectations generated by local surveying tech- 
niques that the court of appeals decided to define the high water line 
by "the application of the traditional and customary method by 
37 N.Y.2d a t  297, 333 N.E.2d a t  360, 372 N.Y.S.2d a t  55 (emphasis added). I t  is a question 
whether a rule of construction must be "ripened" into a rule of property in order to give the 
law's protection to justified reliance thereon. Nonetheless, the court of appeals clearly chose 
to treat the line-of-vegetation rule as so ripened. 
102. By way of contrast, the Supreme Court of Alaska recognized a substituted high water 
line (a so-called "meander line") as only presumptive evidence of the boundary for title 
purposes in Hawkins v. Alaska Freight Lines, Inc., 410 P.2d 992 (Alas. 1966), where the real 
high water line was obscured by vegetation. The court thus managed to solve the practical 
problem of proof in a specific case without forever relinquishing the state's title to tideland 
areas. In general, absent clear intent, such lines are not taken as the boundary, and the actual 
high water line controls. See Maloney & Ausness, supra note 1, a t  253. 
103. 37N.Y.2dat296,333N.E.2dat359,372N.Y.S.2dat54.  
104. 37 N.Y.2d a t  297, 333 N.E.2d a t  360,372 N.Y.S.2d a t  54. I t  may be seriously argued 
that this practice of surveyors was followed only in cases where the survey was for purposes 
other than locating the boundary a t  the shore. See note 142 infra. Historically, both surveyors 
and the court of appeals recognized the distinction between the high water line and the edge 
of the marshlands, and that the former was controlling in boundary disputes. Dunham v. 
Townshend, 118 N.Y. 281, 23 N.E. 367 (1890). It does not seem reasonable to assume that 
there was a discrepancy between surveying practice and a clear line of decisions, going back 
a t  least to 1890, holding that the line of high water is the boundary. Id. ; see additional cases 
a t  note 140 infra. Nonetheless, the court of appeals in Dolphin Lane seems to have assumed 
that such a discrepancy did exist. 
105. See Brief for New York State Land Title Association as Amicus Curiae a t  4, Dolphin 
Lane Associates, Ltd. v. Town of Southampton, 37 N.Y.2d 292,333 N.E.2d 358,372 N.Y.S.2d 
52. 
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which that verbal formulation had been put in practice in the past 
to locate the boundary line along the shore."'nA Irrespective of 
whether the surveyor's long-standing practice was originally correct 
or incorrect, its persistence through the years, as the de facto norm 
on boundary questions, has therefore made it law.In7 
By attaching legal significance to surveying practice irrespective 
of whether that practice was originally correct or incorrect, the court 
has admitted the possibility that the boundary line, as apparently 
intended by the original severing grantor,'Os may have been moved 
by subsequent conduct and events.Io9 When the line is so moved, an 
apparent expropriation of one landowner and a corresponding vest- 
ing in his neighbor must occur. At this point two questions are 
raised: How can the apparent expropriation involved in moving the 
line be justified? And even if moving the line is justified in this case, 
is it appropriate to elevate the line-of-vegetation test to a rule of 
property? 
As already noted,Il0 both adverse possession and "practical loca- 
t i o n " ~ ~ ~  are events or conduct which may justify locating the bound- 
ary a t  a place other than that which would be indicated by the 
grantor's manifest intention as expressed in the instrument of con- 
106. 37 N.Y.2d a t  296, 333 N.E.2d a t  359, 372 N.Y.S.2d a t  54. 
107. The court stated: 
To give effect to  such uniform practice is not, as the town contends, to delegate 
arbitrary powers to surveyors to determine property lines; rather i t  is the obverse, 
namely, to recognize that property lines are fixed by reference to long-time surveying 
practice. 
Id. a t  297, 333 N.E.2d a t  360, 372 N.Y.S.2d a t  54. 
Presumably the court meant that  i t  was recognizing, that property lines are fixed by the 
landowners concerned by reference to long-standing surveying practice. If it meant that 
property lines are fixed by the courts by reference to long-standing surveying practice, it is 
difficult to see how the second half of the court's sentence is the "obverse" of the first. 
108. I.e., the patentor under the Dongan patent of 1686. See note 88 supra. 
109. Id. a t  297, 333 N.E.2d a t  360, 372 N.Y.S.2d a t  55. To be more precise, this discus- 
sion deals with subsequent events or conduct which may have changed the principle for 
establishing the boundary line, as  contemplated by the original grant. The line may have 
been moved by events, such as erosion, accretion, or local tidal variations, which affect the 
location of boundaries but do not change the principle for establishing them. See State v. 
Bishop, 46 App. Div. 654, 359 N.Y.S.2d 817 (2d Dep't 1974). The movement of the line due 
to such latter events may be constructively deemed to have been contemplated by the original 
grantor, within the overall concept of "high water line." Accordingly, such movements can 
be recognized without doing violence to the original grantor's intention. 
110. See text accompanying notes 86-87 supra. 
111. 1.e. locating the line where the parties have, in actual practice, treated the line as 
being. 
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veyance itself. Both could conceivably be invoked in support of a 
particular boundary line which, by long continued understanding 
and acquiescence, has been recognized by all concerned. However, 
the two are nonetheless somewhat different in their theoretical un- 
derpinnings. ' 
Although the matter is not entirely free from confu~ion,"~ the 
distinctive role of practical location would seem to be to assist in 
the interpretation of instruments of conveyance which are indefinite 
as to boundaries.Il3 For example, where a larger piece of land is 
severed into two smaller parcels and the deed fails to describe the 
boundary (or does so ambiguously), the conduct of the parties-e.g., 
actual patterns of occupation or putting up a fence-can dissipate 
the vagueness of the deed and thereby give the courts a basis for 
upholding the parties' intent.Il4 Similarly, evidence of a prior gen- 
eral understanding as to particular matter-e.g., the boundaries of 
"Oak Hill Farm9'-may supply a basis for enforcing a grant "of Oak 
Hill Farm" even without more particular words of description.I1" 
Though the latter is perhaps not, strictly speaking, "practical" loca- 
tion, the theoretical justification is the same; in attempting to gauge 
the intent of the parties, resort to extrinsic facts, outside the formal 
112. Cases may be found to the effect that  "practical location" has legal significance 
irrespective of any actual agreement of the boundary neighbors, and that it is a rule of repose, 
resting upon the same principles as  adverse possession. E.g., Katz v. Kaiser, 154 N.Y. 294, 
48 N.E. 532 (1897); Jones v. Smith, 64 N.Y. 180 (1876); Baldwin v. Brown, 16 N.Y. 359 (1857). 
It may indeed be that "practical location" of a boundary by the parties can gain the force of 
law in appropriate cases by applying a theory of adverse possession or by an independent 
theory which is analogous to adverse possession. See text accompanying notes 135-144 infra. 
In cases such as  Baldwin v. Brown, supra, where the deed description was quite unambiguous, 
an adverse possession-type theory might be the only basis for giving the support of law to a 
practical "location" different from the location described in the deed. See Sherman v. Kane, 
86 N.Y. 57 (1881). However, statements in the cases to the contrary notwithstanding, i t  is 
submitted that the distinctive role of practical location, as a determiner of boundaries, is to 
supply extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent (where the deed-expressed intent is indefinite 
or ambiguous), not to  justify the placement of boundaries in derogation of that  intent. See 
Ratcliffe v. Gray, 3 Keyes 510, 513 (N.Y. 1867); Bell v. Hayes, 60 App. Div. 382, 69 N.Y.S. 
898 (2d Dep't 1901). Even though this somewhat limited conceptualization of practical loca- 
tion may not be entirely reconcilable with all of the judicial statements on the subject, it is 
used here nonetheless in the interest of analytical clarity-to keep the operation of practical 
location separate from that of adverse possession. 
113. 12 AM. JUR. 2d, Boundaries 8 87 (1964); 15 N.Y. JuR., Deeds 8 73 (rev. 1972). 
114. Harris v. Oakley, 130 N.Y. 1, 28 N.E. 530 (1891); see 12 AM. JUR. 2d, Boundaries 5 
88 (1964); 6 N.Y. JuR., Boundaries g 10 (1959). 
115. See Jones v. Smith, 73 N.Y. 205, 209 (1878); 6 N.Y. JuR., Boundaries 8 8 (1959); 15 
N.Y. JuR., Deeds 5 88 (rev. 1972). 
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expression of intent, may give insights which will clear up uncer- 
tainties. In this role, practical location is distinct from adverse pos- 
session in that, unlike the latter, practical' location theoretically 
involves no expropriation. It merely gives the intended import to an 
instrument of conveyance despite a defective expression of that in- 
tent in the instrument itself. Rather than expropriate, it leaves the 
parties where they intended to be, based on evidences of intent 
which are found dehors the instrument. 
Thus, in Dolphin Lane, it is possible that the dispositive grant116 
may have contemplated a boundary line at  the line of vegetation 
irrespective of where the high water line may have been. After all, 
the grant apparently made no reference to high water lines; rather, 
it simply granted to the town the "rivers, waters, lakes, ponds, 
brooks, streams, beaches, harbors", etc.l17 The high water line con- 
cept is read in only as a rule of construction, yielding presumably 
to any actual (and provable) contrary intention. On this theory, if 
there were proof that everybody at  the time assumed the line of 
vegetation to be the boundary, reinforced by evidence of surveying 
practice, such proof would justify the court of appeals' line-of- 
vegetation test on the very terms that it was propounded: it locates 
"the boundary line of property, title to which has passed from owner 
to owner until it has now vested" in the present owner.lLR That is, 
the line is not moved by the test; it is confirmed to be where it 
always has been. 
Unfortunately, two factors make this analysis of unlikely validity. 
First, there is the reference to "beaches" in the grant to the town.l19 
The word "beach" denotes lands washed by the sea,lZ0 which lands 
are per force seaward of the high water mark. Hence, the reference 
to beaches shows an intention that the line of high water, not the 
line of vegetation, was the boundary contemplated by the grantor. 
Secondly, in order for practical location to serve as evidence of the 
grantor's intention, the conduct or understandings relied on pre- 
sumably would have had to exist at  or about the time of the grant, 
116. See note 76 supra. 
117. Town of Southampton v.  Mecox Bay Oyster Co., 116 N.Y. 1, 3, 22 N.E. 387 (1889), 
quoting the patent in confirming the town's title to lands under water. The patent itself, 
though substantially identical, reads slightly different. See notes 76, 90 supra. 
118. 37'N.Y.Pd at 296, 333 N.E.2d at 359, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 54. 
119. See text accompanying note 117 supra. 
120. Trustees of Town of Easthampton v. Kirk, 68 N.Y. 459, 463 (1877). 
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in this case in 1686.lZ1 There is apparently no solid evidence of sur- 
veying practice or other relevant conduct as of that time,lzZ and 
indeed the then applicable English rule of strict construction123- 
putting the boundary a t  the high water linelZ4-along with the 
well-known "policy of the crown in not granting tidal waters to 
private individuals"125 both militate against concluding that any 
such practice or conduct did exist. Thus, it appears that the bound- 
ary has moved; that the line intended by the original grantor con- 
trols no more. 
Adverse possession, as a result of misunderstanding the original 
boundary or otherwise,128 supplies an independent basis for locating 
the line a t  a place other than as originally created. There is no 
requirement that the conduct constituting the adverse possession 
have occurred a t  any particular time in relation to the original 
grants of title. It is only necessary that the possession be continued 
without interruption through a time span equal to the period of 
limitations for ejectment.lZ7 Thus, if there were proof in Dolphin 
121. See notes 76, 88 supra. 
122. There are apparently historical indications that  the "meadows" were "laid out" to 
private owners by the town and were susceptible to private ownership and use for cutting "last 
hay" (Spartina patens) as  fodder. See Brief for Appellant a t  11-12, Brief for The New York 
State Association of Professional Land Surveyors as Amicus Curiae a t  10, Dolphin Lane 
Associates, Ltd. v. Town of Southampton, 37 N.Y.2d 292, 333 N.E.2d 358, 372 N.Y.S.2d 52 
(1975). But there is apparently no concrete indication that areas covered by the coarser 
Spartinu alternipom (cordgrass), which requires twice-daily tidal inundation, were consid- 
ered anything other than public domain. See also Brief for New York State Land Title 
Association as Amicus Curiae a t  19-21. 
123. See note 51 supra and accompanying text. 
124. Bulstrode v. Hall, 82 Eng. Rep. 1024 (K.B. 1662); see Maloney & Ausness, supra note 
1, a t  198-200. The New York courts have interpreted the high water mark with respect to  
colonial grants. Sage v. Mayor, 154 N.Y. 61, 69, 47 N.E. 1096,1098 (1897) ("the title ends a t  
high water mark, as  the law stood a t  the date of the Nichols charter and as  it stands today"); 
accord, In re Mayor of New York, 182 N.Y. 361, 75 N.E. 156 (1905); Mayor of New York v. 
Hart, 95 N.Y. 443 (1884). 
125. Smithtown v. St. James Oyster Co., 80 Misc. 173, 177, 140 N.Y.S. 981, 984 (Sup. 
Ct. 1913). 
126. Apparently, adverse possession under a claim of right is not defeated in New York 
by showing that the claimant acted under a misapprehension of fact. Brand v. Prince, 43 App. 
Div. 2d 638, 349 N.Y.S.2d 222 (3d Dep't 1973). Compare Grube v. Wells, 34 Iowa 148 (1871) 
with Daily v. Boudreau, 231 Ill. 228, 83 N.E. 218 (1907). See generally 21 Baylor L. Rev. 95 
( 1969). 
127. The period is now generally ten years in New ~ o r k ,  N.Y. C.P.L.R. $ 212(a) (McKin- 
ney 1972), but the period is twenty years for actions by the state or a grantee (or patentee) of 
the state. Id. a t  $ 211. The doctrine of constructive adverse possession which excuses a 
claimant under color of title from actual possession of the whole parcel would appear to  be 
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Lane (i) that the adjacent occupants from time to time had pos- 
sessed their respective parcels as though the boundary were the line 
of vegetation, and (ii) that the upland owner had held his possession 
up to that line for the requisite period, then still another basis would 
exist to justify the court of appeals' line-of-vegetation test, though 
it is not the basis on which the court of appeals apparently relied.lZ8 
However, there are several problems in fashioning an adverse pos- 
session justification for the line-of-vegetation test adopted by the 
court of appeals. 
First, it is unlikely that there was the requisite possession by the 
upland owners of the disputed tidal lands. Since 1848, it has been 
the law in New York by statutelZ9 that, for purposes of adverse 
possession, there must either be usual cultivation or improvement 
of the land or a substantial enclosure protecting it.130 The law may 
be more liberal in its definition of possession in other  jurisdiction^,'^^ 
but in New York, the statutory essentials'of possession must be 
present "and no others"132 are satisfactory. Neither indicating the 
disputed lands on a map as belonging to the upland owner133 nor 
inapposite. N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTIONS LAW § 511 (McKinney 1963). Under the doctrine, occu- 
pation of part of the premises described in an instrument serves as occupation of the whole 
premises described in the instrument. Id. But occupation of a portion of premises which is 
unambiguously included in an instrument should not also be deemed to be occupation of 
adjacent vacant areas which the instrument does not unambiguously include. It  would be 
bootstrapping to use a "color of title" theory to show possession if the purpose of showing 
possession is to cure description defects in the very same instrument which is supposed to 
supply the "color of title." Only if the claimants claimed under a deed describing the disputed 
tidal area definitely (e.g., by courses and distances) would the doctrine of constructive ad- 
verse possession seem to come into play. 
128. The principles underlying adverse possession have been judicially referred to in 
support of the operation of practical location as a means of determining boundaries. See note 
112 supra. Consequently the court of appeals, since it  was not explicit, cannot be said to have 
not considered adverse possession as a possible analytical support for its holding. See text 
accompanying notes.135-44 infra. 
129. N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTIONS LAW 5 522 (McKinney 1963) (corresponds to Code of Proce- 
dure § 85, Act of April 11, 1849, ch. 438, 5 85, [I8491 N.Y. Laws 634). 
130. Id. 9 511. 
131. See, e.g., Brumigan v. Bradshaw, 39 Cal 24, 50 (1870), where the court stated: "the 
acts of dominion and ownership which establish a possessio pedis must correspond, in reason- 
able degree, with the size of the tract, its condition and appropriate use, and must be such 
as usually accompany the ownership of land similarly situated." Accord, Ewing v. Burnett, 
36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 39 (1837). 
132. N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTIONS LAW 5 522 (McKinney 1963). 
133. Archibald v. New York Cent. & H.R. R.R. Co., 157 N.Y. 574, 580, 52 N.E. 567, 568 
(1899). 
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surveyor's practices satisfy the terms of the statute. Thus, absent 
usual cultivation, improvement, or an enclosure after 1861 (when 
the uplands passed to private owners),134 it is hard to see how the 
boundary could have been affected on an adverse possession theory. 
An adverse possession-like policy of repose has, as previously 
noted, appeared in the case law under the heading of "practical 
location".135 Apparently, long-term acquiescence in a boundary line 
(probably for the period of limitations on ejectmentI3" will have the 
effect of legitimizing the line even though the claimant cannot show 
actual possession up to the line for the applicable period of limita- 
t i o n ~ . ' ~ '  However, in order for such an "adverse-acquiescence" 
theory to affect a boundary, the line must be definite and the ac- 
quiescence must be by both parties.i38 In particular, it is required 
that the losing party knew the location of the line acquiesced in and, 
probably, he must have joined in establishing it.139 This "adverse- 
acquiescence" type of practical location could supply fairly compel- 
ling support for the court of appeals' conclusion that the boundary 
line in Dolphin Lane lies a t  the line of vegetation; it could, that is, 
provided that the long-standing practice of surveyors can be trans- 
lated into acquiescence on the part of the town. 
But what, precisely, did the town acquiesce in? Certainly there 
is no indication that the town ever objected to the surveyor's prac- 
tice. But neither is there evidence that it had any reason So 
134. See text accompanying notes 93-94 supra. 
135. See note 112 supra. 
136. Corning v. Troy Iron & Nail Factory, 44 N.Y. 577, 595 (1871); Fisher v. McVean, 25 
App. Div. 2d 575, 266 N.Y.S.2d 951 (3d Dep't 1966). 
137. E.g . ,  Baldwin v. Brown, 16 N.Y. 359 (1857); Ratcliffe v. Gray, 3 Keyes 510 (N.Y. 
1867); Konchar v. Leichtman, 35 App. Div. 2d 890,315 N.Y.S.2d 888 (3d Dep't 1970); Fischer 
v. McVean, 25 App. Div. 2d 575, 266 N.Y.S.2d 951 (3d Dep't 1966); Bell v. Hayes, 60 App. 
Div. 382, 69 N.Y.S. 898 (2d Dep't 1901). 
138. Adams v. Warner, 209 App. Div. 394, 204 N.Y.S. 613 (3d Dep't 1924); Whitney v. 
Dudley, 40 N.Y.S.2d 838 (Sup. Ct. 1943); Hubbell v. McCullough, 47 Barb. 287 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1866). 
139. Corning v. Troy Iron & Nail Factory, 44 N.Y. 577, 595-96 (1871). 
140. Prior to the court of appeals' decision in Dolphin Lane, courts in New York had been 
defining the "high water line" formulation according to the tides rather than by references 
to vegetation. Sage v. Mayor, 154 N.Y. 61, 70,47 N.E. 1096, 1098 (1897) ("title . . . did not 
extend beyond the dry land. . . ."); Dunham v. Townsend, 118 N.Y. 281,23 N.E. 367 (1890); 
State v. Bishop, 46 App. Div. 2d 654, 359 N.Y.S.2d 867 (2d Dep't 1974); Board of Educ. v. 
Nyquist, 51 Misc. 2d 902, 274 N.Y.S.2d 229 (Sup. Ct. 1966), aff 'd ,  28 App. Div. 2d 936, 281 
N.Y.S.2d 486 (3d Dep't 1967). The town should have likewise been justified in assuming that  
the actual line of high water was the boundary even though erroneous notions on this point 
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far as can be told, there were never any trespasses under claim of 
right on the disputed premises nor any other legal wrongs commit- 
ted which would trigger the town into action.14' Nor was there any 
fence built or other act to designate the boundary on the locus in 
If the court of appeals has held that title may be lost by 
acquiescing in conduct that is not unlawful ( i . e . ,  the surveyor's 
practice of mismapping boundaries), and in the absence of any tres- 
pass or other cause of action, it is not likely that it has contributed 
much to the "stability and predictability of matters involving title." 
Moreover, such a result would be directly contrary to holdings in, 
may have persisted elsewhere. 
The court of appeals cited an opinion of the New York Attorney General, 33 STATE DEP'T 
REP. 415 (1925) to support the "authenticity" of the surveying practice of following the 
vegetation line. The Attorney General noted that, in a number of other jurisdictions, the high 
water line is "found a t  the point where the action of the waters ceases to affect the soil or 
the vegetation upon it." Id. a t  418 (emphasis added). See Maloney & Ausness, supra note 1, 
a t  256-58. The Attorney General's opinion concluded that "in most instances . . . the test 
[is] . . . point or extent to which the upland vegetation survives or would survive excepting 
for the presence and action of the waters." 33 STATE DEP'T REP. a t  421 (emphasis added). But 
the court of appeals fixed the boundary, not by the line of upland vegetation, but by reference 
to the line of Spartina alternipora, a species that requires tidal inundation twice daily in order 
to colonize or thrive. See text accompanying notes 78-82 supra. Thus, the court of appeals 
cited the Attorney General's opinion, but seems to have missed its clear import, viz. that  the 
actual line of high water is the boundary and that upland vegetation is merely a convenient 
indicator of where that line of high water would lie. 
141. Cf. Adams v. Rockwell, 16 Wend. 285, 302 (Ct. Err. N.Y. 1836) ("the party whose 
right is to be thus barred must have silently looked on and seen the other party doing acts."). 
142. There is no evidence that  any of the historical surveys were ever made for the specific 
purpose of delineating the boundaries between town lands (under water) and the several 
parcels held by upland owners. An apparently key survey of the area in question in Dolphin 
Lane, the so-called Cook Survey made in 1900, appears to have been primarily for the purpose 
of mapping inland areas, rather than to fix the boundary a t  the coast. Brief for Appellant a t  
6, Dolphin Lane Associates, Ltd. v. Town of Southampton, 37 N.Y.2d 292, 333 N.E.2d 358, 
372 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1975). The field notes for the Cook Survey were inadequate to map a shore 
line. 72 Misc. 2d a t  880,339 N.Y.S.2d a t  979. In any event, i t  is doubtful that  the Cook Survey 
would be relevant to  a boundary determination unless there was proof of, inter alia, the 
competency of the surveyor and the purpose of the survey. Ramapo Mfg. Co. v. Mapes, 216 
N.Y. 362, 367, 110 N.E. 772, 775 (1915). 
For the purposes of convenience, it has been the practice of many surveyors to map the 
apparent shore line (oiz. a t  the line of vegetation) rather than the real high water line 
especially where the exact coastal boundary is irrelevant to the purpose of the survey. Malo- 
ney & Ausness, supra note 1, a t  252. This fact, rather than customary acceptance of the line 
of vegetation as the boundary, may best explain the "long-standing practice of surveyom" 
which was relied on by the court of appeals. Thus to support its new "test" for fixing shore 
boundaries, the court may have adopted a practice which itself was never intended to desig- 
nate those boundaries definitively. 
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for example, the prescriptive easement area where "negative" ease- 
ments (e.g., of light and air) cannot be acquired by long-term "ac- 
quiescence" of the servient neighbor.143 However, even assuming 
that title may be lost by acquiescence in a mere claim, and that 
acquiescence by the town were shown, the suitability of such a basis 
for the Dolphin Lane holding ought still to be subject to the objec- 
tions"' applicable to the more usual type of adverse possession. 
One of these objections to supporting the new boundary with an 
adverse possession theory (or an adverse possession-type theory) is 
that, in this case as in the usual case, the title being extinguished 
is that of a public body, of a municipality, as here, or of the state 
itself. To be sure, the title to lands held by the state or a municipal- 
ity can be extinguished by adverse possession, though the period of 
limitations is twenty years for the state or its grantees (or patentees) 
rather than the ten year period which applies in the case of private 
owners.'" However, the power of private persons to acquire title to 
public lands by adverse possession is subject to limitations not appl- 
icable to adverse possession generally; such public lands may not, 
it  is said, be acquired by adverse possession if held by the state or 
municipality in a sovereign governmental capacityI4" or held in trust 
for the public good,14' but they may be acquired by the adverse 
possessor if held in a proprietary capacity.148 Likewise, public lands 
which are inalienable cannot, it is said, be lost by adverse posses- 
s i ~ n . ' ~ ~  
143. See, e.g., Parker & Edgerton v. Foote, 19 Wend. 309 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1838). 
144. See text accompanying notes 145-58 infra. 
145. See note 127 supra. 
146. Town of Hornellsville v. City of Hornell, 38 App. Div. 2d 312, 328 N.Y.S.2d 941 (4th 
Dep't 1972); Hinkley v. State, 202 App. Div. 570, 195 N.Y.S. 914 (3d Dep't), aff'd, 234 N.Y. 
309, 137 N.E. 327 (1922); Long Island Research Bureau v. Town of Hempstead, 203 Misc. 
619, 118 N.Y.S.2d 39 (Sup. Ct. 1952), aff'd, 283 App. Div. 663, 126 N.Y.S.2d 857 (2d Dep't 
1954), aff 'd, 308 N.Y. 818, 125 N.E.2d 872 (1955). 
147. Smith v. People, 9 App. Div. 2d 205, 193 N.Y.S.2d 127 (3d Dep't 1959); People v. 
Baldwin, 197 App. Div. 285, 188 N.Y.S. 542 (3d Dep't 1921), aff'd, 233 N.Y. 672, 135 N.E. 
964 (1922); cf. Long Island Beach Buggy Ass'n. v. Islip, 58 Misc. 2d 295, 295 N.Y.S.2d 268 
(Sup. Ct. 1968), aff'd, 35 App. Div. 2d 739, 316 N.Y.S.2d 430 (2d Dep't 1970). 
148. E.g., People v. Trinity Church, 22 N.Y. 44 (1860); People v. Arnold, 4 N.Y. 508 
(1851); Hamlin v. People, 155 App. Div. 680, 140 N.Y.S. 643 (4th Dep't 1913). 
149. City of N.Y. v. Wilson & Co., 278 N.Y. 86, 15 N.E.2d 408 (1938); Knickerbocker Ioe 
Co. v. Shultz, 116 N.Y. 382, 22 N.E. 584 (1889); Arnold's Inn, Inc. v. Morgan, 63 Miec. 2d 
279, 310 N.Y.S.2d 541 (Sup. Ct. 1970); Banner Milling Co. v. State, 117 Misc. 33,191 N.Y.S. 
143 (Ct. C1. 1921), modified on other grounds, 210 App. Div. 812, 205 N.Y.S. 911 (4th Dep't 
1924), aff'd, 240 N.Y. 533, 148 N.E. 668, cert. denied, 269 U.S. 582 (1925). 
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On the basis of these principles, it has been fairly consistently 
held that title to publicly-owned waterlands cannot be acquired by 
adverse possession.150 These holdings are sometimes on the grounds 
that such lands are held as sovereign or for the public good151 and 
sometimes on the grounds that the lands being inalienable, are not 
subject to loss by adverse possession.152 However, the cases are not 
uniform in holding that publicly-owned waterlands are immune to 
acquisition by adverse possession. A few decisions have held that 
title may be acquired by an adverse possessor whenever the public 
lands in question were alienable.153 It has also been said, in dicta, 
that where waterlands are not held in trust for the public, title to 
them may be acquired by adverse possession.154 But these cases 
upholding an adverse possession-title on the grounds of alienability 
do not mention the fact that the lands in question may nonetheless 
have been held in a governmental capacity or in trust for the public. 
In short, the New York cases on adverse possession of publicly- 
owned waterlands are not easily reconciled. However, it seems clear 
that the fact that waterlands may be alienable should remove only 
one of two objections to allowing title to be lost by this process. 
Alienable or no, waterlands still may be (and generally are)155 
150. In re Piers Old Nos. 8-11, 228 N.Y. 140, 126 N.E. 809 (1920); Knickerbocker Ice Co. 
v. Shultz, 116 N.Y. 382, 22 N.E. 584 (1889); In re Roma, 223 App. Div. 769, 227 N.Y.S. 46 
(2d Dep't 1928); Hinkley v. State, 202 App. Div. 570, 195 N.Y.S. 914 (3d Dep't), aff'd,  234 
N.Y. 309 (1922); Campbell v. Rodgers, 182 App. Div. 791, 170 N.Y.S. 258 (1st Dep't 1918); 
Gunn v. Bergquist, 201 Misc. 992, 108 N.Y.S.2d 644 (Sup. Ct. 1951); In re Eaat River Drive, 
159 Misc. 741, 289 N.Y.S. 443 (Sup. Ct. 19361, af f 'd ,  259 App. Div. 1007, 21 N.Y.S.2d 507, 
appeal denied, 260 App. Div. 847, 23 N.Y.S.2d 203 (1940). 
151. E.g.,  Hinkley v. State, 202 App. Div. 570, 195 N.Y.S. 914 (3d Dep't), aff'd,  234,N.Y. 
309 (1922). 
152. In re Piers Old Nos. 8-11, 228 N.Y. 140, 126 N.E. 809 (1920); Gunn v. Bergquist, 201 
Misc. 992,108 N.Y.S.2d 644 (Sup. Ct. 1951); In re East River Drive, 159 Misc. 741,289 N.Y.S. 
443 (Sup. Ct. 1936), aff 'd ,  259 App. Div. 1007, 21 N.Y.S.2d 507, appeal denied, 260 App. Div. 
847, 23 N.Y.S.2d 203 (1940). 
153. Reid v. New York, 274 N.Y. 178, 8 N.E.2d 326 (1937); In re City of New York, 217 
N.Y. 1,111 N.E. 256 (1916); Timson v. Mayor, 5 App. Div. 424,39 N.Y.S. 248 (1896); Arnold's 
Inn, Inc. v. Morgan, 63 Misc. 2d 279, 310 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1970). 
154. Gottfried v. State, 23 Misc. 2d 733, 747, 201 N.Y.S.2d 649, 666 (Ct. C1. 1960). 
155. See, e.g. ,  Tiffany v. Town of Oyster Bay, 234 N.Y. 15,136 N.E. 224 (1922); In re Long 
Sault Dev. Co., 212 N.Y. 1, 105 N.E. 849 (1914); Hinkley v. State, 202 App. Div. 570, 195 
N.Y.S. 914 (3d Dep't), aff 'd ,  234 N.Y. 309, 137 N.E. 327 (1922). Instruments such as the 
Dongan and Andross patents, see note 76 supra, were governmental in nature and intended 
to form the basis of political communities, Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 411 
(1842), and the lands they conveyed were to be held by the recipient municipalities in a 
governmental or quasi-sovereign capacity for the benefit of the public, People ex rel. Palmer 
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deemed to be held by the state (or municipality) in a governmental 
capacity-for the public good-and this in itself should be enough 
to ,prevent their unilateral appropriation by private  claimant^.'^^ 
The state "cannot lose such lands as it holds for the public, in trust 
for a public purpose . . . ."I5' A forest preserve is a classic example 
of public trust lands immune to adverse posse~sion. '~~ Should tide- 
washed lands, also held in a public trust and similarly important 
for preservation, be any different? It is not easy to see why. 
However, the greatest obstacle to an adverse possession justifica- 
tion for the court's holding is that, for adverse possession to change 
boundaries, the presence of its elements must be considered on a 
case by case basis, The fact that A has acquired prescriptive title 
against B does not mean that A's neighbor has also acquired such a 
title. Yet, by announcing what appears to be a rule of property, 
v. Travis, 223 N.Y. 150, 119 N.E. 437 (1918); Town of Brookhaven v. Smith, 188 N.Y. 74,78, 
80 N.E. 665, 667 (1907); People ex rel. Howell v. Jessup, 160 N.Y. 249, 259, 54 N.E. 682, 685 
(1899). 
156. Compared with the obvious policy objective of the governmental ownership or "pub- 
lic good" limitation on adverse possession, the alienability test is merely a technical one, and 
i t  thus should yield whenever the technicality of inalienability is not present. It appears that  
the theory behind the inalienability test is that a grant to a private individual of inalienable 
lands cannot be presumed, precluding title by adverse possession. See People v. System 
Properties, Inc., 2 N.Y.2d 330, 141 N.E.2d 429, 160 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1957); City of New York 
v. Wilson & Co., 278 N.Y. 86,97, 15 N.E.2d 408, 413 (1938); Smith v. People, 9 App. Div. 2d 
205,193 N.Y.S.2d 127 (3d Dep't 1959). Or perhaps the explanation is that the policy judgment 
which led to establishing particular lands as  inalienable applies as  well to exempt such lands 
from the statute of limitations. See 2 N.Y. JuR., Adverse Possession $102 (1958). In any event, 
it appears that waterlands are alienable by the state (subject to the jus publicum), see text 
accompanying notes 41, 49 supra, and indeed the Public Lands Law authorizes certain offi- 
cers of the state to make such conveyances thereof as  "they shall deem necessary to promote 
the commerce of this state, or . . . for the purpose of beneficial enjoyment of the same by 
the adjacent owner for the benefit of the public a t  large." N.Y. PUB. LANDS LAW $75(7) 
(McKinney Supp. 1974). Apparently municipal owners of waterlands have similar powers to  
make conveyances. Arnold's Inn, Inc. v. Morgan, 63 Misc.2d 279, 310 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1970), 
citing City of New York v. Wilson & Co., supra. And the only general restriction upon such 
powers of alienation (other than the preservation, with qualification, of the jus publicum) 
would seem to be the limitation on massive transfers to other than upland owners. See 
authorities a t  notes 47, 48 supra. Whether allowing every upland owner to acquire a piece of 
the foreshore, as the court of appeals has done, would be a massive transfer invalid under 
earlier cases, is problematical. Implicitly, the court of appeals seems to have held in Dolphin 
Lane that it would not. 
157. People v. Baldwin, 197 App. Div. 285,288, 188 N.Y.S. 542,545 (3d Dep't 1921), aff'd, 
233 N.Y. 672, 135 N.E. 964 (1922). 
158. People v. Shipley, 229 App. Div. 21, 241 N.Y.S. 17 (3d Dep't 1930); People v. Bald- 
win, 197 App. Div. 285, 188 N.Y.S. 542 (1921), aff'd, 233 N.Y. 672,135 N.E. 964 (1922); Helms 
v. Diamond, 76 Misc. 2d 253, 349 N.Y.S.2d 917 (Sup. Ct. 1973). 
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possibly applicable to all shore boundaries in the state, the court of 
appeals has moved the line for everybody. By stating that the high 
water line means the line of vegetation, the court has, in effect, 
replaced the high water line rule with an entirely different rule, 
exactly the sort of midstream change of rules that it set out to avoid. 
From the foregoing, it appears to be the undeniable effect of the 
court of appeals' decision in Dolphin Lane to place the boundary 
seaward of the actual line of high water. Although the court's lim- 
ited purpose was to define the seaward extent of the upland fee, 
there is nothing in the opinion which suggests that the court has not, 
at  the same time, defined the landward extent of the jus publicum 
as well. Information as to the actual high water line (hydrographic 
data) was said to have "no legal signifi~ance."'~~ In making its line- 
of-vegetation rule a rule of property, the court has turned a question 
of intent de facto into a question of policy. The policy which the 
court seeks to promote (the protection of long-standing expecta- 
tions) would seem to apply equally whether the question was one of 
ownership per se (as in Dolphin Lane) or the question of what lands 
are burdened by the public's right to use. Thus, if the line-of- 
vegetation test is appropriate to control the seaward limit of lands 
extending to the sea it should, on the same policy basis, control the 
landward extent of the jus publicum as well.160 
But either way, whether or not the court has definitively settled 
the landward extent of the jus publicum, the decision seems to have 
impacts which transcend the narrow controversy before it and which 
appear to be, on balance, not good. 
In the first place, by moving the boundary seaward (based on past 
practices), the court has given legal effect to a fairly massive expro- 
priation of the public's property in favor of upland owners.lB1 Substi- 
159. 37 N.Y.2d a t  295, 333 N.E.2d a t  359, 372 N.Y.S.2d a t  53. 
160. However, not all of the jus publicum can be lost in lands upward of the line of 
vegetation. The federal government's paramount power to regulate commerce and navigation, 
see note 40 supra, cannot be diminished by the court of appeals. And apparently federal law 
controls the definitions and limitations (spatial and otherwise) on this federal power. Bonelli 
Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973); Borax Consol., Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10 
(1935). It has already been held that  tidal marshlands in New York are "navigable" within 
the United States Constitution and federal courts may enjoin (under the Rivers and Harbors 
Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. 8 403 (1970)), the filling of such areas. United States v. Baker, 2 Envir. 
Rptr. Cas. 1849 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). 
161. The court did not specifically decide whether its line-of-vegetation test would also 
apply in those cases where that  line was actually inland from the actual line of high water. If 
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tuting a line-of-vegetation test for the line of high water as the 
standard of demarcation has changed the title to the jus privatum 
in'the lands between the two lines. Since public bodies hold even 
the jus privatum in such lands "in trust for the public good,"162 
whereas the title to uplands (as newly defined) is not so held, this 
aspect of the decision alone can be considered to be public- 
adverse.IB3 But the legal consequences of the expropriation do not 
stop there. 
For one thing, the decision may impair or jeopardize the tidal 
wetlands preservation and management program which it is the 
recently confirmed policy of the state to promote. Under the Tidal 
Wetlands Act, enacted in 1973,IB4 lands subject to protection are 
defined as "those areas which border on or lie beneath tidal waters 
. . . ."le5 Prior to the court of appeals' holding in Dolphin Lane, the 
lands sought to be protected were, in large part, owned either by 
local municipalities or by the state itself, in trust for the public 
good. Regulation of the uses of these lands, even those owned by 
r n i m i ~ i ~ ~ l i t i e s , ~ ~ ~  would have been unobjectionable, notwithstand- 
the "high water line" formulations were defined by reference to the line of vegetation in those 
cases as well, the net amount of land removed from the public domain would be less, with 
losses in some shore areas being offset by gains in others. There might even be a net increase 
in the public domain. 
However, for a t  least two reasons, it appears unlikely that  the line-of-vegetation test will 
control in situations where the vegetation line is inland from the "real" high water line. First, 
the court predicated its holding on long-standing surveying practice and the expectations 
created thereby. Unless, as  is doubtful, surveyors have long fixed boundaries on bare beaches 
by reference to the line-of-vegetation, the theory of Dolphin Lane would seem inapplicable. 
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the expropriation of private owners, via a redefini- 
tion of the term "high water line" would probably be unconstitutional. See Hughes v. Wash- 
ington, 389 U.S. 290, 294-98 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring), approved in Bonelli Cattle Co. 
v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313,331 (1973). The public, as such, having no comparable constitutional 
protection as against the state, see note 34 supra, cannot complain of expropriation through 
seaward movements of the boundary on this basis; but private persons can complain of 
landward movements. Consequently, the effect of Dolphin Lane seems to be to  define the 
boundary as the high water line or the long-recognized line of vegetation, whichever is the 
more seaward. The result is a net expropriation of public lands. 
162. Tiffany v. Town of Oyster Bay, 234 N.Y. 15, 21, 136 N.E. 224, 225 (1921); see note 
155 supra. 
163. The adverse effect would, of course, be exacerbated if, as  is apparently the case, the 
line-of-vegetation test also defines the upland for the purposes of jus publicum as well. See 
text accompanying note 159 supra. 
164. N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 790 (McKinney 1973)(codified a t  N.Y. ENV~RONMENTAL 
CONSERVATION LAW, art. 25 (McKinney Supp. 1974)). 
165. N.Y. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION LAW 8 25-0103(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1974). 
166. The rights and powers of municipalities being subject to the state's sovereign powers, 
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ing that the regulation mandated outright preservation, prohibiting 
all use. However, with Dolphin Lane, management programs which 
heretofore may have been regulation of the public domain now be- 
come the regulation of private property. Hence, if heavy regula- 
tion-e.g., prohibition of all uses-is deemed desirable, the result 
may be a flood of constitutional challenges, claiming compensation 
for takings in eminent domain. The flood may have indeed already 
begun.IB7 
The prospects for the success of such constitutional challenges 
have been treated .amply and ably elsewhere,IB8 but the problem is 
essentially this:16B 
While property may be regulated to a certain extent,  if regulation goes too 
far i t  will be recognized as a taking . , . this  is a question of degree . . . . 
And this "question of degree" may be a serious one. Owing to the 
fragile ecological nature of wetland areas, .the appropriate regulation 
may well be outright preservation, prohibiting any use at  all of 
much of the wetlands in the state. Yet, it is hard to imagine a degree 
of regulation that goes further than a complete prohibition of all use. 
Admittedly, the distinction between police power regulation and 
takings by eminent domain is a hazy one at  best, and it cannot even 
be said that there are uniformly accepted lip-service standards for 
making the distinction.170 However, courts in other jurisdictions 
have overturned regulations similar in object with the New York 
Tidal Wetlands Act where the restrictions were "so burdensome 
. . . that they are the equivalent of an outright taking."17' And in 
see note 34 supra, municipalities would have much greater difficulty making a constitutional 
case of "taking by regulation" than would private persons. People ex rel. Palmer v. Travis, 
223 N.Y. 150, 165-66, 119 N.E. 437, 442-43 (1918). Under the original Tidal Wetlands Act, 
N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 790 (McKinney 1973) lands acquired by eminent domain are exempt 
from regulation. However, this exemption was recently repealed. N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 136 
(McKinney 1975). 
167. Already there has been a challenge to the constitutionality of the Tidal Wetlands Act 
on the grounds that i t  operates to take property for public use without just compensation. 
New York Housing Auth. v. Commissioner of Environmental conservation, - Misc. 2d 
, 372 N.Y.S.2d 146 (Sup. Ct. 1975). The court was able to side-step the constitutional 
issue this time by declaring the challenge to be "premature." Id. a t ,  372 N.Y.S.2d a t  
150. But this floodgate will not hold forever. 
168. Comment, supra note 1, a t  459-74. 
169. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415-16 (1922). 
170. Comment, supra note 1 a t  459-74. 
171. State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711,715 (Me. 1970); accord, Bartlett v. Zoning Comm'n, 
161 Conn. 24, 31, 282 A.2d 907, 910-11 (1971) ("the plaintiffs use of his property is non- 
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New York, a regulation may constitute a taking that requires com- 
pensation to the landowner if "the consequent restrictions upon his 
property preclude its use for any purpose to which it is reasonably 
adapted."172 
Should appropriate management of the wetlands mean their pres- 
ervation from encroachments by all destructive uses, the power of 
the state to effect such management, without paying just compensa- 
tion, has now become more questionable. As previously noted, it has 
already been q~es t i0ned . l~~  To be sure, the court of appeals still has 
not ruled that extensive or prohibitory regulation under the Tidal 
Wetlands Act would exceed the police power; thus, it can still be 
hoped a t  least that the court will not require the public to buy back 
the lands which were lost in Dolphin Lane. But no one can be sure. 
Another consequence of Dolphin Lane may be to arrest develop- 
ment, even by legislation, of any systemized approach to delineating 
shore boundaries a t  the high water line. Such systemized ap- 
proaches, accompanied by programs of shore surveys and mapping, 
have been adopted or considered for adoption in other states.174 With 
such legislation, surveys, and mapping, it is possible to give scien- 
tific definiteness to the shore boundaries within a legislated high 
water line standard. However, in New York, such a legislature- 
mandated systemized approach may be now impossible because the 
court of appeals has not only rejected the relevance of scientific data 
in locating the line of high water, it  also adopted a substitute test, 
as a rule of property, to serve as the exclusive indicator of the "high 
water line" location. By thus concretizing the meaning of "high 
existent unless he happens to own a boat"); Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Town- 
ship of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963). But see Marks v. Whiting, 6 
Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971); Just v. Mannette Co., 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 
N.W.2d 761 (1972). 
172. Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 226,15 N.E.2d 587,589 (1938); 
see Williams v .  Town of Oyster Bay, 32 N.Y.2d 78, 295 N.E.2d 788, 343 N.Y.2d 118 (1973). 
173. See note 167 supra. 
174. Florida Coastal Mapping Act of 1974, ch. 74-56, [I9741 Fla. Laws 34. A proposed 
Model Coastal Mapping Act, on which the Florida statute is based, is reproduced and de- 
scribed by its draftsmen in Maloney & Ausness, supra note 1, a t  241-73. This model act was 
produced with the assistance of personnel of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Adminis- 
tration and the National Ocean Survey (formerly the Coast & Geodetic Survey), which has 
been mapping the United States coastline since 1835. Under the Model Act, accurate coastal 
surveys are to be produced (section 6) which will constitute evidence (but not exclusive 
evidence) in court (section lo), and the mean high water mark is to be determined by 
scientific methods approved by an agency formed thereunder (section 15). 
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water line," tying it by law to a visible and definitely locatable 
reference, the line-of-vegetation test may forever preclude other 
boundary standards of lesser generosity to upland owners. The test, 
as a rule of property, creates vested rights.175 
So long as the operative term "high water line" remained an 
abstract linguistic formulation, it remained susceptible, within lim- 
its, to a certain flexibility of interpretation-able to meet the exi- 
gencies of particular cases. Various types of evidence could be intro- 
duced, subject only to the rule of relevancy, to show where the 
"real" line was located-all without violence to the concept that the 
actual line of high water, if ascertained, would control. But even 
more importantly, as an abstract formulation, the term did not 
preclude the introduction, by the legislature or the courts, of ever 
more informative techniques to determine the intended boundary 
location. 
The court of appeals felt that constant replacement of old scien- 
tific techniques with even more refined ones would mean constant 
changes in the on-the-site line,176 but in fact it would not. The line 
would stay the same (subject to erosion, accretion and the like), 
though the surveyor's approximation of the line might vary some- 
what. This discrepancy between the "real" line and the surveyor's 
line might be critical in the case of a $1000 per square foot downtown 
urban lot; but a t  the shore it is tolerable, given the types of potential 
uses to which the shore may be put and, more to the point, given 
the "approximate" nature of high water lines in any event.17' 
Thus, for a scant benefit in terms of "predi~tability,"'~~ the court 
of appeals has frozen-perhaps forever-the definition in this state 
175. See Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 311 (1973), citing Hughes v. Wash- 
ington, 389 U.S. 290, 294-98 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
176. See text accompanying notes 82-83 supra. 
177. It  may be argued that it was never a good idea to adopt an uncertain standard like 
the "high water line" as the basis of a rule of construction. This may be so, and a more certain 
standard, e.g., the line of vegetation, may have always made more sense. However, if one is 
to accept the court of appeals' thesis in Dolphin Lane, now hardly seems to be a good 
time-after 300 years of titles granted in reliance on the "high water line" rule-to make a 
change. 
178. In any event, the "predictability" achieved is somewhat lessened by the fact that, 
a t  least for federal purposes (navigation and commerce) the "real" high water line, based on 
the tides, will continue to apply. See note 160 supra. Thus, in New York there are now two 
standards for fixing the boundary of the bay, the state line-of-vegetation test, applicable for 
some purposes, and the federal high water test, applicable for others. 
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of "high water line," placing i t  by law a t  the line of vegetation. 
Although the court said that conforming shore boundaries to hydro- 
graphic data is an innovation which "should be left to the Legisla- 
t ~ r e , " ' ~ ~  the court's new rule of property may have left the legisla- 
ture constitutionally powerless to act. 
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